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WHEN COURTS SHOULD IGNORE STATUTORY TEXT
Jesse M. Cross *

Abstract. Statutory interpreters often rely upon a fundamental assumption: namely, that every word of a statute is meant to
be read—and given legal force—by the courts. This assumption
unites both textualists and intentionalists, and it has been invoked
by Justices as diverse as Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens,
and Justice Scalia—the last of whom called it a “cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation.” It underpins at least nine separate canons of statutory interpretation, and it even shapes how courts interpret legislative documents beyond statutes. It is difficult to imagine a more central assumption in statutory interpretation.
As this Article shows, however, this assumption is incorrect.
Congress routinely inserts language into statutes that it hopes
courts will ignore. Rather than addressing courts, this language
targets one of three nonjudicial audiences: interest groups, executive agencies, or nonpartisan congressional offices.
This Article—written by a former drafter of congressional
statutes—documents this legislative practice. Moreover, it argues
that, to the extent that courts want to act as faithful agents of Congress, they should refrain from interpreting and applying this text
that Congress intends solely for a nonjudicial audience. The Article outlines a methodology that courts can use to this end—a
methodology that can accurately identify statutory text Congress
wants courts to ignore.
In addition to showing that courts are reaching incorrect results in important cases—and providing a methodological solution to this problem—the Article’s analysis also holds theoretical
lessons for the major schools of thought in statutory interpretation. For intentionalists, it provides a new theory about how
courts should weigh legislative materials (including statutory text,
appropriations committee reports, and CBO cost estimates). For
textualists, it shows that many canons of construction must be
modified or discarded, and it also rebuts the foundational notion
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Yale Law School, J.D. 2011;
University of California, Irvine, M.A. 2006. I wish to thank William Eskridge, Jr., Bruce Ackerman,
Nicholas Parrillo, Heather Gerken, John Witt, Derek Black, Maureen Brady, Benjamin Means, and Lisa
Eichhorn for the generous and helpful feedback they provided with respect to early drafts of this Article.
I also wish to thank my former coworkers at the Office of the Legislative Counsel for the U.S. House of
Representatives.
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that statutory text can be divorced from intent or audience. And,
for public-choice theorists, it challenges the central idea that legislators are mere agents for interest groups—an idea rebutted by
the discovery of a drafting practice that purposefully carves out
spaces for principled governance in statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
In the field of statutory interpretation, both textualist and intentionalist
interpreters consistently rely upon a basic, shared idea: namely, that courts
should interpret and enforce every word of a statute. 1 Known as the “surplusage canon,” 2 the “rule against surplusage,” 3 or the “rule against superfluities,” 4 it is an idea that has received deep and sustained support in the American legal community. It has been invoked by Justices as diverse as Chief
Justice Marshall, 5 Justice Stevens, 6 and Justice Scalia 7—the last of whom
called it “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation.” 8 It underpins at least
nine separate canons of statutory interpretation, and it shapes even how
courts interpret legislative documents beyond statutes. 9 It is difficult to imagine a more central rule in the field of statutory interpretation.
Why has this rule garnered such widespread support? For many interpreters, it is justified by the idea that, by applying the rule, they are giving
effect to congressional intent. 10 Congress presumably intends for every word
1

As Caleb Nelson puts it: “[T]extualists (like all other interpreters) embrace the presumption
against surplusage.” Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355 (2005). To use the
vocabulary of speech-act theory, these interpreters assume that statutory text addresses the courts through
what is called an “indirect speech act,” which relies on readers’ background knowledge of constitutional
structure to know that the statute, while not explicitly addressing the courts, nonetheless operates as an
instruction to the courts to enforce its statutory directives. See JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND
MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 30 (1979).
2 E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 174 (2012).
3 E.g., TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESKBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 85 (2006).
4 E.g., id.
5 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).
6 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 (1995).
7 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion).
8 Id.
9 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 107 (Negative-Implication Canon), 112 (Mandatory/Permissive Canon), 132 (Presumption of Nonexclusive “Include”), 174 (Surplusage Canon), 195 (Associated-Words Canon), 199 (Ejusdem Generis Canon), 217 (Prefatory-Materials Canon), 221 (Title-andHeadings Canon), 225 (Interpretive-Direction Canon); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 182 (2017) (using the CBO canon as a potential
starting point for statutory interpretation); e.g., infra note 156.
10 See, e.g., Melissa Davenport, Comment, Risky Business: The FDA Bans Ephedra, and Gets a Leg
Up on the Dietary Supplement Industry, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 635, 642 (2007) (referring to “the ‘rule
against surplusage,’ which suggests a court will better realize congressional intent by giving meaning to
every word used in a statute”); Jacob R. Karabell, The Implementation of “Balanced Diversity” Through
the Class Action Fairness Act, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 313 n.82 (2009) (“[T]he rule against surplusage
presumes that Congress intends to give every aspect of a statute meaning.”); Brian G. Slocum, Comment,
The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 827–28 (2010) (“[T]he rule against
surplusage[] assumes that Congress intends for each statutory term to have meaning.”).
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of its statutory commands to be backed by the threat of judicial enforcement,
the logic goes—and so courts, by giving effect to every word, are simply
acting as faithful agents of Congress. 11 In this way, the rule against surplusage typically is anchored in an assumption that Congress views the courts as
the intended audience for every word of its statutes. 12
As the following pages explain, however, this assumption is incorrect.
When Congress drafts statutes today, it frequently inserts passages that it
hopes courts will ignore. Indeed, having worked for six years as a drafter of
congressional statutes, the Author of this Article personally inserted many
such passages into federal legislation. 13 Rather than addressing the courts,
these passages were designed to speak exclusively to nonjudicial audiences.
By interpreting these passages of statutory text as though they were intended to contribute to court-enforceable commands, courts have failed to
accurately ascertain the intended import of these passages—a failure that produces contorted interpretations of otherwise straightforward statutes. This
failure is problematic, for it prevents courts from acting as faithful agents of
Congress—an interpretive ideal that the vast majority of courts claim to embrace.
This Article documents the existence of these passages of statutory text
that Congress does not intend for judicial audiences, and it outlines the other
audiences that Congress seeks to reach with this text. Specifically, it observes
that there are three nonjudicial audiences that Congress regularly addresses
via such passages.
The first of these audiences is constituent groups—in particular, specialinterest groups. Statutory text aimed exclusively at this audience serves a
specific function: it allows these constituent groups to hear their values echoed in the text of congressional statutes. In so doing, the text gives constituent
groups the sense that they partake in an ongoing relationship with legislators—a relationship wherein their commitments and values are heard and
considered. As such, this text can achieve its desired effect without commanding or binding any party to a certain course of action. Consequently, the
text need not be interpreted or enforced by courts in order to achieve its desired effect. In the following pages, this brand of constituent-targeted language will be referred to as expressive rhetoric.
The second alternative audience for congressional statutes is executive
agencies. As Professor Edward L. Rubin previously has noted, Congress’s
statutory directives sometimes are intended solely for the agencies that will

11 For a textualist embracing this intent-based logic of the rule against surplusage, see, for example,
Nelson, supra note 1, at 355.
12 See id. (“The reason for this presumption is simple: the fact that members of [Congress] bothered
to include the second provision sheds light on what they probably intended the first provision to mean.”).
13 The Author worked as a Counsel in the Office of the Legislative Counsel for the House of Representatives, the main statutory drafting office in the House of Representatives, from 2011 to 2017.
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implement the directives. 14 Put differently, Congress does not always intend
to use court-enforceable commands as the vehicle by which to direct agency
action. There is a simple reason why it does not: agencies are dependent on
Congress in many ways. This reality makes agencies attentive not only to the
policies that Congress requires the agencies to implement, but also to those
policies that Congress merely suggests or directs the agencies to implement.
Following Rubin, this suggestion-driven statutory language will be labeled
in the following pages as directive rhetoric. 15
As this Article shows, Congress uses specific drafting techniques to integrate directive rhetoric into statutory text. These techniques, while unanticipated by Rubin, are identical to the techniques Congress uses in the context of expressive rhetoric. Importantly, they are techniques that courts can
isolate and identify in the effort to parse Congress’s intentions more accurately.
The final alternative audience of congressional statutory rhetoric is the
collection of nonpartisan offices of Congress—offices that assist (and sometimes intervene in) the legislative process. Statutory text aimed at this audience is not focused on the goal of implementing a particular policy in the real
world, but rather on soliciting a certain answer or response from one of these
offices. This rhetoric will be referred to in this Article as institutionally inquisitive rhetoric.
If courts genuinely wish to discover and enforce congressional intent,
this Article will argue, they should refrain from interpreting and enforcing
statutory text intended solely for one of these three audiences. To many
judges and scholars, however, the idea of acknowledging nonbinding rhetoric
in congressional statutes may seem disconcerting. It may seem to invite a
world in which judges are empowered to ignore broad swaths of congressional statutes. Once judges may acknowledge the presence of nonoperative
rhetoric in statutes, it might be asked, what is to prevent them from using this
power dishonestly? What will prevent judges, in other words, from using this
power to ignore any statutory provision that conflicts with their policy preferences?
The answer to these concerns is found in the narrow, responsible manner in which Congress addresses its nonjudicial audiences. As the following
pages explain, Congress uses its alternative rhetorics only in specific, identifiable statutory locations—namely, in locations in which established drafting
conventions have created the inevitability, or at least the high likelihood, of
statutory redundancy. In the following pages, these locations are referred to
as redundancy-encouraging features of statutes. In this use of redundancyencouraging features, Congress takes advantage of redundancies as locations
14

Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 374

(1989).
15

When the present Article refers to “directive rhetoric,” it is using the term “directive” in the sense
used by Rubin, not in the broader sense used by the speech-act theorist John Searle, despite its occasional
reliance upon Searle’s theorizations. See id. at 380.
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that allow it to bifurcate a single statutory directive, splitting that directive
into statutory text aimed at the courts, on the one hand, and statutory text
aimed at nonjudicial audiences, on the other hand. Consequently, a power to
parse Congress’s different rhetorics does not translate into a freewheeling
power that would permit courts to ignore any statutory text they find unpalatable. Rather, it would sanction an interpretive methodology endorsed in the
following pages—one that, above all, requires courts to bring a new form of
interpretive scrutiny to the redundancy-encouraging features that populate
federal statutes.
In addition to showing that courts have reached incorrect results in important cases, this Article—through its analysis of Congress’s different rhetorics—offers several theoretical contributions to the field of statutory interpretation. A few of these are worth noting at the outset. First, it posits a new
hierarchy of legislative materials. Under this hierarchy, a court gives weight
to those materials that it has reason to believe were drafted with the courts as
their intended audience—and it would adopt a new method for investigating
whether this belief is valid. Unlike the method adopted by most textualists,
this method does not automatically assume that all statutory text is intended
to address the courts. Unlike the method adopted by many intentionalists, it
does not presume that every congressional expression of intent is meant to
operate as a guide to the courts in their interpretive endeavor. Instead, it requires courts to conduct an additional inquiry once they have identified a
congressional action or decision (such as the decision to insert a word or
phrase into statutory text). They must ask: what type of rhetorical intent motivated this action or decision? Was the action or decision motivated by a
legal desire to achieve enforcement in the courts? Or did Congress instead
pursue this goal purely for expressive, directive, or institutionally inquisitive
reasons?
Second, the Article suggests that many of the semantic canons are being
misapplied by the courts. While many of these canons do seem grounded in
legitimate theories about language usage, the canons go astray by layering
these linguistic theories upon a false assumption: namely, that every word of
a federal statute is designed to contribute to a court-enforceable rule. The
result is that seemingly intuitive canons are applied in ways that misconstrue
congressional intent. By attempting to redress these misguided efforts, this
Article has implications for a host of canons of interpretation which are addressed in the following pages. These include the rule against surplusage, the
ejusdem generis canon, the expressio unius canon, the noscitur a sociis
canon, the title-and-headings canon, the mandatory/permissive canon, the
definitions canon, the presumption of nonexclusive “include” canon, and the
CBO canon. 16 In most instances, the lesson is that any court aspiring to act
as a faithful agent of Congress should not apply these canons when there is
16

The abbreviation “CBO” refers to the Congressional Budget Office, an office that provides cost
estimates of legislation for Congress. For a discussion of the CBO canon, see infra note 231–235 and
accompanying text.
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compelling evidence that the statutory text at issue was written solely as expressive, directive, or institutionally inquisitive rhetoric.
Third, the analysis of expressive rhetoric in Part I rebuts a central tenet
of public-choice theory—a theory which asserts that legislators are utterly
beholden to special-interest groups. As Part I explains, legislators use expressive rhetoric to placate interest groups by addressing their rhetorical needs in
nonoperative statutory text. In so doing, legislators seek to insulate operative
statutory text from these interest group needs—an approach which, ideally,
allows this operative text to articulate rules that are more public-regarding.
The Article therefore suggests that legislators are attempting to negotiate a
world of interest-group politics in a way that still allows them to create spaces
for good governance. In this regard, it supports the work of those such as
Professor Richard Fenno who have criticized the public-choice model by arguing that legislators do more than simply rubber-stamp the decisions made
by interest groups. 17 Further, it observes that when courts disregard this linguistic maneuver by Congress, they not only betray their goal of faithful
agency; rather, they also allow interest-group politics to disrupt the national
political system even beyond the level deemed acceptable by Congress.
Fourth, the Article rejects a notion that Justice Scalia, in particular,
propagated: the idea that the meaning of a statute can be adequately understood in isolation from any analysis of intent or audience. The interpretive
theory advocated by Justice Scalia returned to an idea that gained prominence
among formalist literary theorists in the 1950s and 1960s: namely, that written texts are autonomous creations that rely on neither author nor audience
for their essential meaning. 18 In response to those formalist theorists, a subsequent generation of literary scholars emerged 19—a generation whose work
informed this Article. These scholars viewed a text’s cues about its intended
audience as inseparable from the “meaning” of that text. 20 This Article accepts the insights offered by these subsequent scholars, and it transposes
these insights into the field of statutory interpretation. In so doing, this Article
rejects Justice Scalia’s formalist methodology, and it offers an alternative to
that methodology. To the extent that this alternative methodology produces
more compelling interpretations of congressional statutes, it should be taken
as evidence of the inseparability of authorial intent, text, and audience—and
consequently as a critique of Justice Scalia’s attempt to quarantine these factors from each other.
A number of theoretical insights emerge, therefore, from the vision of
congressional statutes espoused in the following pages. According to this
17

See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 44 (1973).
See, e.g., W.K. WIMSATT, JR. & MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, The Intentional Fallacy, in THE
VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 3, 3 (1954) (“[T]he design or intention of the author
is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art . . . .”).
19 See generally WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION (1961); Wolfgang Iser, The Reading
Process: A Phenomenological Approach, 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 279 (1972).
20 See, e.g., BOOTH, supra note 19, at 89–91; Iser, supra note 19, at 279.
18
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vision, modern political realities motivate congressional policymakers to use
statutory text as a vehicle to address multiple audiences. In so doing, these
policymakers become complex rhetorical actors who employ multiple voices
in statutes to fulfill the full range of their political needs. If judges genuinely
desire to act as faithful agents of Congress, it is imperative for them to hear
Congress’s multiple voices and discern which of those voices truly is addressed to courts. This Article aims to provide statutory interpreters with the
tools necessary to accomplish this interpretive task.
This Article is divided into six Parts. Part I examines Congress’s use of
expressive rhetoric, Part II looks at directive rhetoric, Part III examines Congress’s tendency to blend expressive rhetoric and directive rhetoric, and Part
IV examines institutionally inquisitive rhetoric. Finally, Part V provides an
in-depth examination of an illustrative case, United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 21 to demonstrate the need for courts to adopt the methodology outlined in this Article.
I.

EXPRESSIVE RHETORIC

A.

Message Bills

It is widely acknowledged that congressional legislation is designed, at
least in some instances, to afford benefits to certain constituent groups. 22 According to the traditional account, legislation accomplishes this objective
through a three-step process. 23 First, a bill is enacted into law. Second, the
bill—because it is enacted into law—instructs the executive and judicial
branches to implement and enforce the policies that the bill outlines. 24 Third,
the implementation of these policies affords benefits to constituents. 25 Under
this account, courts and executive agencies are the intended audiences of

21

564 U.S. 162 (2011).
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION:
LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 77–78 (2014); see also Trent Lott &
John Breaux, Want a Functioning Legislative Branch? Bring Back Earmarks., WASH. POST (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/want-a-functioning-legislative-branch-bring-back-earmarks/2018/01/24/981b1672-0089-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html (“Members of Congress understandably seek to represent their states and districts in the best way possible—including voting for bills
that benefit constituents directly.”).
23 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 22, at 77 (“Under [even] the rosiest versions of pluralism,
politics is seen as the process by which interest groups seek to satisfy their goals, with each group securing
the policies they most intensely desire . . . .”)
24 Rubin, supra note 14, at 373.
25 MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 40 (2d ed.
1989).
22
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statutory text, and while constituents benefit from that text, they receive the
benefit only via the work of an intermediate actor. 26
This traditional account ignores a type of bill that is omnipresent in Congress, however: the “message bill.” As a New York Times editorial once observed, message bills are “bills designed not to become law.” 27 On the floor
of Congress, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton similarly noted of one
such bill:
Every Member of the House knows that [the bill under debate] will never see the light of day
on the other side of the Congress, in the Senate, and will never become law. It is a message
bill. That is all right. Both sides, when they capture the Congress, participate in message
bills. 28

Message bills cannot afford benefits to constituent groups through the conventional three-step process, in other words, for the simple reason that they
are never enacted into law.
Despite this fact, however, it is widely acknowledged that message bills
are drafted and introduced to satisfy constituent groups. 29 If message bills’
purpose is to provide benefits to constituents, and if they do not accomplish
this via the typical three-step process, then how do they accomplish this task?
The answer to this question is embedded in the very label given to these
bills: they allow legislators to send a “message” directly to constituents. As
Senator Olympia Snowe put it in the Harvard Journal on Legislation: “Much
of what occurs in Congress today is what is often called ‘political messaging.’ Rather than putting forward a plausible, realistic solution to a problem,
members on both sides offer legislation that is designed to make a political
statement.” 30 For this reason, Members of Congress often analyze the bill by
examining “the message it sends” to constituents, not by scrutinizing what
the bill would accomplish upon enactment. 31 As one scholar has observed,
messaging is properly evaluated not to discover whether it is supported by
26

See Rubin, supra note 14, at 373, 376.
Editorial, The Bills to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/
06/08/opinion/the-bills-to-nowhere.html (emphasis added); see also Federal Research and Development:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech. & Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
105th Cong. 12 (1998) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (referring to what Sen. Rockefeller “would call a
message bill as opposed to a passable bill or . . . appropriations effort”).
28 160 CONG. REC. H159 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2014) (statement of Rep. Norton).
29 See Senator Olympia J. Snowe, The Effect of Modern Partisanship on Legislative Effectiveness
in the 112th Congress, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 27 (2013).
30 Id.
31 144 CONG. REC. H10,178 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Rep. Becerra) (analyzing a bill
that essentially was a “message bill” that “will not have any practical legal affect [sic] on our laws and
how we conduct our affairs” in terms of “the message it sends”); see also Sarah Mimms & Billy House,
House Barely Passes Paul Ryan’s Budget, with 12 Republicans Voting No, NAT’L J. (Apr. 10, 2014, 8:48
AM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/59374 (quoting Rep. Massie as saying Paul Ryan’s budget bill
“is a messaging bill” and analyzing it in terms of “[w]hat it says” to constituents).
27
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solid, implementable policy but rather to determine whether the message
“resonates with what Members of Congress (and their constituents) want to
hear.” 32
In the case of a message bill, in other words, the text of the bill is itself
the benefit accorded to constituents. The bill echoes back to constituents the
views and values that they find meaningful. 33 As such, message bills seek to
communicate directly to these constituents—which is to say, the statutory
text of these bills adopts constituents as its directly intended audience.
Message bills send this “message” to constituents in two ways. First,
because message bills will never be implemented, these bills can contain policies that are designed purely to appeal to constituent groups, without regard
to the practical consequences of implementation. In the following pages,
these will be referred to as expressive policies. Second, these bills can include
language that is chosen solely for its vivid ability to communicate policy
goals to constituents, rather than for its ability to communicate precise policy
directives to the courts. This will be referred to as expressive rhetoric.
Since Congress has unilateral power to draft statutory text, message bills
can achieve this communicative goal without any assistance from the executive branch or the courts. This is why message bills do not adopt the coordinate branches as intended audiences—and why they never intend to do so.
Expressive policies and expressive rhetoric only need to speak with a specific, easily achieved illocutionary force: they express Congress’s awareness
of constituents’ values, and they do so without directing or commanding that
agencies or courts take any action in furtherance of these values. 34
The congressional practice of drafting message bills offers two important lessons. First, the fact that Members of Congress expend precious
time and resources producing message bills reveals that Members value the
opportunity to use statutory text as a vehicle for expressive policies and expressive rhetoric. It undoubtedly would require less time and effort for Members to address constituent groups by inserting these policies and this rhetoric
32

Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 387, 421 (2007); see also The Bills to Nowhere, supra note 27 (noting that message bills
drafted by Republicans were written “to satisfy the ideological desires of conservative voters,” not to
enact substantive policies).
33 In this sense, legislative text becomes one of the many nonlegislative benefits that Congress provides to interest groups, a benefit similar to others that Professor Morris Fiorina has documented. Cf.
FIORINA, supra note 25, at 40.
34 The distinction between the illocutionary force of a statement, as opposed to the content of that
statement, has been laid out in detail by speech-act theorists. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO
THINGS WITH WORDS 105–06 (2d ed. 1975). Summarizing Professor Austin’s insights, scholars have said:
“[E]lementary illocutionary acts are of the form F(P): they are composed of a force F and of a proposition
P. On the one hand, sentences like ‘Please, help me!’ and ‘You will help me’ . . . express . . . the same
propositional content but different forces. On the other hand, elementary sentences like ‘Is it snowing?’
and ‘Are you coming?’ . . . express . . . the same force but different propositional contents.” ESSAYS IN
SPEECH ACT THEORY 5 (Daniel Vanderveken & Susumu Kubo eds., 2001).

464

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[26:2

into nonlegislative texts (such as press releases). Yet these Members consistently expend the effort necessary to use statutory text as the vehicle for these
expressive elements, drafting and introducing many message bills in each
Congress. 35 The prevalence of this practice shows that, for Members, the insertion of these expressive elements into statutory text is a distinct and valuable benefit that they can offer to constituents.
Second, message bills reveal a particular strategy used by Members to
achieve this expressive goal. This strategy consists of two parts. First, in the
effort to avoid addressing courts or agencies, these legislators make use of a
location in statutory text where Congress knows that its rhetoric will not be
buttressed by an institutional enforcement mechanism. Here, that location is
the text of statutes that will never be enacted into law. Second, that location
is used as a hiding place for rhetoric that speaks directly to constituents—and
in terms that are meaningful to them.
B.

Statutory Redundancies: Congressional Drafters on Expressive
Rhetoric

To many judges and scholars, the notion that Congress includes expressive rhetoric and expressive policies in message bills is neither troubling nor
surprising. After all, this notion does not challenge the basic idea that, when
it comes to enacted statutes, Congress speaks solely in what, in the following
pages, will be described as operative legal rhetoric—which is to say, in rhetoric that Congress intends courts to interpret and enforce.
Interpreters who adopt this perspective clearly are correct in one sense:
Members of Congress do not have the luxury of inserting expressive policies
into enacted statutes. Regardless of any suspicions that a policy was designed
to appeal directly to a nonjudicial audience, courts and agencies simply will
not ignore entire sections of enacted statutes. 36 This is precisely what would
be required for expressive policies to speak directly to constituents and evade
enforcement by the courts. Congress undoubtedly is aware of this fact, and
there is little reason to presume that Congress is including entire provisions
in enacted statutes that it expects the courts to overlook.
However, there is strong evidence—in recent drafter interviews, as well
as in statutory text itself—to support the idea that Congress is inserting
35 In recent years, some have accused Congress of drafting only message bills. See, e.g., 160 CONG.
REC. H159 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2014) (statement of Rep. Norton) (“The problem with the majority in the
House today is that it only does message bills.”); The Bills to Nowhere, supra note 27 (“This is now the
pattern of business in the House of Representatives: Spend most of the time passing bills designed not to
become law . . . .”).
36 Scalia and Garner note that “[l]awyers rarely argue that an entire provision should be ignored—
but it does happen.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 175. They cite Fortec Constructors v. United
States, 760 F.2d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1985), as an instance of lawyers making such an argument. See id. Scalia
and Garner add that “[t]he court correctly rejected this argument.” Id. at 176.
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expressive rhetoric into strategic locations in enacted statutes. 37 First, consider the evidence found in drafter interviews. In their recent survey of congressional drafters, Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman observed:
[R]espondents [to the survey] . . . pointed out that the political interests of the audience often
demand redundancy. They told us, for example, that “sometimes politically for compromise
they must include certain words in the statute—that senator, that constituent, that lobbyist
wants to see that word”; similarly, they said that “sometimes the lists are in there to satisfy
groups, certain phrases are needed to satisfy political interests and they might overlap” or that
“sometimes you have it in there because someone had to see their phrase in the bill to get it
passed.” One example provided was a statute drafted to cover “medical service providers” that
had to be amended to include a specific (and redundant) reference to “hospitals” to satisfy
stakeholders. . . .
[W]hat respondents told us was . . . that even in short statutes—indeed, even within single sections of statutes—that terms are often purposefully redundant to satisfy audiences other than
courts. 38

In this passage, Gluck and Bressman reveal a congressional drafting
practice of inserting language into statutes that displays the two hallmarks of
expressive rhetoric. 39 These hallmarks, it will be recalled, were that (1) the
inserted language is designed to speak to constituents, not courts; and (2) the
language is inserted into a statutory location that Congress hopes, and reasonably expects, will allow that rhetoric to evade enforcement by courts. 40
Consider the first of these hallmarks: that the statutory text at issue is
designed to speak to constituents, not courts. The respondents to Gluck and
Bressman’s survey suggest that, on occasion, Congress uses statutory text to
address an intended audience “other than courts,” an audience that instead
comprises “constituent[s],” “lobbyist[s],” “[outside] groups,” and “political
interests.” 41 This is precisely the intended audience of message bills.
Skepticism likely exists, however, as to whether Gluck and Bressman’s
respondents also point toward statutory text that satisfies the second hallmark
of expressive rhetoric: namely, that this rhetoric is inserted into a statutory
location that Congress hopes and expects will evade judicial enforcement. To
skeptical interpreters, the insertion of a term or phrase into the text of an
enacted statute inevitably signals a congressional intent to have this term interpreted and enforced by the courts.
Yet the respondents to Gluck and Bressman’s survey describe a practice
of inserting this rhetoric specifically into a strategic set of locations within
37

See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–
35 (2013).
38 Id. (footnotes omitted).
39 See id. at 934–36.
40 See id. at 934–35.
41 Id. (emphasis removed).
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statutory text: locations of statutory redundancy. 42 As Gluck and Bressman
put it, their respondents pointed toward a drafting practice that involves the
insertion of “terms [that] are often purposefully redundant” into statutes. 43
There is no legal reason, of course, why this language must be redundant. If
constituents insist upon inserting certain terminology into a statute, that terminology could simply be used as the sole articulation of the relevant idea in
the legislation, rather than in addition to redundant text located elsewhere in
the bill. Yet Gluck and Bressman’s respondents describe a different drafting
practice. Why might that be?
If there is one type of statutory text that Congress might reasonably expect courts to grudgingly treat as surplusage, it would be redundant text. As
Justice Scalia and Professor Garner have observed, situations in which
judges—even textualist judges—must treat statutory terms as redundancies
are “lamentably common.” 44 Put differently, if Members of Congress felt obligated to insert rhetoric into statutory text that they intended exclusively for
an audience other than the courts, it makes sense that these Members would
do so in redundant passages of these statutes, since these passages are frequently acknowledged by courts as redundant and therefore as lacking independent legal effect. As such, Gluck and Bressman’s survey raises the possibility that Congress uses statutory redundancies specifically because redundancies provide a statutory location that is best able to satisfy the second
hallmark of expressive rhetoric: it provides a location to insert text that might
evade enforcement by the courts.
Why, then, is Congress adding text to statutes that displays both hallmarks of expressive rhetoric? Gluck and Bressman’s respondents provide an
answer: these redundancies, they explain, are built into statutory text because
“that constituent, that lobbyist wants to see that word” and “because someone
had to see their phrase in the bill.” 45 This is exactly the function that was
identified in the context of message bills: the function of allowing certain
constituent groups, either instead of receiving a legally enforceable benefit
or in addition to receiving such a benefit, to obtain the distinct expressive
benefit of observing their values and terminology reflected in statutory text. 46
It is possible, of course, that the constituent “wants to see [a specific]
word” 47 in a statute not because the constituent seeks an expressive benefit,
but because the constituent believes that the word will have operative legal
effect that is unforeseen by Congress. Even if this is the case, though, it
should have little bearing on statutory interpretation. The task of the courts
is not to discern the intent of constituents. Rather, to the extent that courts
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 935.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 177.
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 934.
See id.
Id.
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understand themselves to be operating as “faithful agents” of Congress, their
task is to reconstruct the intent of this legislative body. 48 Gluck and Bressman’s respondents reveal this intent with regard to certain statutory redundancies: it is an intent, their respondents explain, to insert gratuitous text into
statutes in order to award to constituents the distinct benefit of “see[ing] their
phrase in the bill.” 49 In this sense, it is an intent to give an expressive benefit
directly to constituents and without regard to the courts. 50
An awareness that Congress might be using expressive rhetoric in enacted statutes inevitably raises the question: can (and should) this awareness
inform or alter the practice of statutory interpretation in the courts? In their
article, Gluck and Bressman express skepticism on this front, saying:
Whether this “audience” issue should have an effect on how courts interpret statutes is a different matter—after all, how will courts be able to discern when drafters are talking to them as
opposed to other audiences? A fictitious interpretive rule may be required precisely because
investigating the intended audience would be too difficult. 51

Is it true, however, that it would be prohibitively difficult to isolate and
identify those instances in which Congress inserts expressive rhetoric into
statutes? An interpretive methodology certainly can be developed that looks
for the two hallmarks of expressive rhetoric, after all. If both hallmarks are
found in the text of a statute, the interpreter can conclude (quite reasonably)
that Congress inserted this rhetoric into the statute for an expressive purpose—a purpose analogous to that found in message bills and one that accords with the purpose detailed by Gluck and Bressman’s respondents.
Such a methodology for identifying expressive rhetoric would consist
of a two-step process. First, the interpreter would search the statute for locations of potential redundancy. In particular, the interpreter would seek out
redundancy-encouraging features of statutes (i.e., structural features of statutes that almost inevitably invite redundancies). A number of these features
exist, and they are easily identified within a statute. Titles and headings, for
example, are redundancy-encouraging features, since these features are redundant with the operative provisions that they label. Similarly, defined

48

For the idea that faithful agency implies a search for legislative intent, see, for example, id. at 958
n.188 (explaining that “courts fulfill their duties as faithful agents when correcting obvious typos in the
statute that Congress never could have intended”); Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors,
and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 50 (2006) (“A view of courts as faithful agents of
Congress is longstanding and seems to require enforcement of actual legislative intent.”). But see John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395 (2003) (observing that “[t]he Court has
long emphasized that, as faithful agents of Congress, federal courts have a constitutional duty to implement Congress’s ‘intent’” but also objecting to this understanding of faithful agency).
49 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 934.
50 See id. at 934–35.
51 Id. at 935.
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terms are redundant with their definitions, and examples are redundant with
the rules they illustrate.
In the second step of this methodology, the interpreter would search the
text found in the redundancy-encouraging feature for persuasive evidence
that it is adopting identifiable constituent groups (rather than the courts) as
its intended audience.
In the case where the interpreter identifies statutory text that satisfies
both steps of this methodology, the interpreter could reasonably conclude
that the statutory text was meant to operate analogously to message bills, just
as Gluck and Bressman’s respondents assert it does. 52 The interpreter could
conclude, in other words, that Congress drafted this redundancy with the distinct intention of awarding an expressive benefit directly to a constituent
group, not with the intention of addressing the courts regarding the implementation of a policy.
C.

Titles, Headings, and Obamacare

To appreciate the utility of this two-step methodology, consider its application to the congressional use of the term “Obamacare.” As of February
2018, not a single bill introduced in Congress had used the term “Obamacare” as a substantive term in its operative text. 53 By contrast, seventy-four
bills had used the term in a short title, five in a long title, and eight in a heading. 54 Within each of these bills, the reference to “Obamacare” in a title or
heading was paired with a more legally precise citation in the operative text
of the bill. 55 By using the term “Obamacare” only within titles and headings,
therefore, Congress used the term only within redundant portions of statutory
text. In this regard, Congress used the term in a manner that displays one
hallmark of expressive rhetoric: it inserted this term solely into statutory locations that Congress might plausibly expect to evade enforcement by the
courts.
The other hallmark of expressive rhetoric, it will be recalled, is that statutory text appears addressed primarily to constituents. How is the interpreter
to find statutory text that meets this criterion? For one thing, if expressive
rhetoric is understood as having constituents as its intended audience, then it
makes sense that this rhetoric would adopt the language and categories that
are meaningful to these constituents, even at the expense of legal clarity. One
commonsense strategy, therefore, is to look for rhetoric that sacrifices legal
clarity in order to achieve expressive force with constituents.
52

See id. at 934.
Based on a search of https://www.congress.gov on Feb. 20, 2018.
54 E.g., H.R. 562, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017) (using the term “Obamacare” in the short title).
55 E.g., H.R. 4004, 115th Cong. (2017) (using the term “Obamacare” in the title and the “Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act” in the body of the bill).
53
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The term “Obamacare” clearly meets this criterion. It is a term that has
potent meaning for specific constituent groups. As a New York Times article
explained, “[t]he act is often called ‘Obamacare,’ primarily by Republicans,
as a term of disdain.” 56 A cultural anthropology textbook has noted it as a
paradigmatic example of politically charged rhetoric. 57 In the current political landscape, “Obamacare” clearly is a term that carries great expressive—
and partisan—meaning.
Moreover, “Obamacare” is a term that achieves this expressive force
only through a sacrifice in legal clarity. According to the drafting manual
used by the Office of the Legislative Counsel for the House of Representatives, citations in legislative text should strive for clarity and precision; they
ideally should “identify briefly a law in an unambiguous manner.” 58 Any citation to “Obamacare” plainly does not achieve this goal. Does such a citation
refer only to the freestanding provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, for example? Or does it include amendatory provisions as
well—provisions such as those that simply insert text into the Public Health
Service Act or the Social Security Act? 59 Does it refer only to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, or does it also include the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, the companion vehicle used to
incorporate changes into the health care bill immediately upon enactment? 60
Citations to short titles or public law numbers—as the Legislative Counsel
drafting manual recommends 61—would provide clarity to interpreters who
must parse the language of a statute and determine its precise scope. In so
doing, however, the citation would sacrifice the expressive value found in the
term “Obamacare.”
In its use of the term “Obamacare,” therefore, Congress sacrifices legal
clarity in order to achieve expressive force with constituents, and it does so
in redundant passages of statutory text. This usage suggests that Congress is
inserting expressive rhetoric for constituents into the titles and headings,

56

Amanda Cox et al., Fighting to Control the Meaning of “Obamacare,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2012),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/25/us/politics/fighting-tocontrol-the-meaning-of-obamacare.html?mcubz=2.
57 GARRICK BAILEY & JAMES PEOPLES, ESSENTIALS OF CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 51 (3d ed.
2014).
58 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 47 (1995), http://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_
Legislation/draftstyle.pdf [hereinafter DRAFTING MANUAL] (emphasis added).
59 For sections that are largely or entirely amendatory, see the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 130 (2010) (amending the Public Health Service
Act); id. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (amending the Public Health Service Act); and id. § 10,501, 124 Stat. at
993 (amending the Social Security Act and the Public Health Service Act).
60 See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES
IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 213–30 (4th ed. 2012).
61 DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 48.
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while it inserts operative legal rhetoric intended for the courts elsewhere in
the text of the statute.
This is not the only interpretation available to the statutory interpreter,
however. Indeed, the conventional view of titles and headings counsels toward a different interpretation. Prevailing theories of statutory interpretation
likely would explain these references to “Obamacare” in titles and headings
not by reference to the expressive quality of the term “Obamacare,” but rather
by reference to a different virtue of the term: its brevity. The Supreme Court
has endorsed the idea that titles and headings deviate from statutory text
simply for reasons of brevity, describing these statutory features as providing
“but a short-hand reference” to the policies outlined in the statute’s operative
provisions. 62 Based on this view of titles and headings, Scalia and Garner
defend a “Title-and-Headings Canon” that views these statutory features as
“permissible indicators of meaning.” 63 The Court shares this view of their
permissibility, reiterating it as recently as the 2015 case of Yates v. United
States, 64 albeit without articulating its theoretical underpinnings. 65 From this
perspective, Members of Congress who use the term “Obamacare” in titles
and headings deploy this term simply because proper citations would prevent
the title or heading from being sufficiently succinct.
There are several difficulties with this conventional interpretation, however. First, there are more precise alternatives available if Congress’s goal is
simply to achieve brevity—alternatives that Congress has employed elsewhere in introduced bills. 66 Second, if the term “Obamacare” was being chosen for its brevity rather than for its expressive capacity, then there should
not be a partisan divide in the use of this term. By contrast, all eighty-two of
the bills that deployed the term “Obamacare” were introduced by Republicans. 67 Third, several of the bills that employ the term “Obamacare” surround
the term with additional rhetoric that plainly is meant to highlight the expressive nature of this term. 68 In the “Stop Obamacare’s Risky Provisions Act” 69
and the “Safeguarding Children Harmed by Obamacare’s Onerous Levies
62

Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947). Scalia and Garner
describe this case as “[t]he classic statement about the use of statutory titles and headings in American
law.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 221.
63 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 221.
64 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
65 See id. at 1083.
66 E.g., S. 1642 § 1, 113th Cong. (2013) (referring to “the Affordable Care Act” in the short title);
H.R. 45, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013) (referring to “Health Care-Related Provisions in the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010” in section and subsection headings); H.R. 5417, 111th Cong. § 1
(2010) (referring to “PPACA and HCERA” in the section heading).
67 E.g., H.R. 4004, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending “the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
to require employees of the White House to enroll in Obamacare”; introduced by Rep. Bill Posey, R–FL).
68 E.g., H.R. 3985, 113th Cong. (2014) (using the short title “Stop Obamacare’s Risky Provisions
Act”).
69 H.R. 3985, 113th Cong. (2014).
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Act,” 70 for example, the descriptions of the Act’s provisions as “risky” and
“onerous” clearly are designed to underscore and extend the expressive quality of the term “Obamacare.” 71
Consequently, there is good reason to think that the term “Obamacare”
was chosen for its expressive quality, not for its operative legal quality—the
same quality that was the impetus behind the “message bills” discussed in
the foregoing pages. Meanwhile, since the references to the health care law
in the operative text of these bills are more legally precise but less expressive,
it is reasonable to assume that these references were intended as operative
legal rhetoric—which is to say, as an attempt to translate the concept of
“Obamacare” into a precise citation to be applied by the courts.
In this regard, bills referencing “Obamacare” are not anomalous. Consider two examples that were enacted into law: the “Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act” 72 and the “Helping Heroes Fly Act.” 73 Each of these Acts provides a short title that contains a highly expressive but legally imprecise term
(“terrorism” and “heroes,” respectively 74), and neither Act uses that expressive term in operative text.
As such, the use of “Obamacare” in titles and headings, alongside the
use of “Public Law 111-148” and “Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act” in operative text, begins to illustrate a new view of statutes. According
to this view, bills sometimes appear as fractured texts. They are internally
divided—using several different forms of rhetoric, each of which addresses
a different intended audience.
D.

Example Clauses and the Rule Against Redundancy

Another redundancy-encouraging feature of statutes similarly is worth
examining: example clauses. Example clauses serve a specific function: they
provide one or more concrete examples to illustrate a general rule that is
stated elsewhere in the statutory text. 75 As such, example clauses are structural features that invite redundancy, thus satisfying one step of the two-step
methodology used to identify expressive rhetoric in statutes. (Moreover, they
were specifically mentioned by a statutory drafter in Gluck and Bressman’s
survey as a location for expressive rhetoric. 76) Under the two-step
70

H.R. 2443, 113th Cong. (2013).
See H.R. 3985 § 1; H.R. 2443 § 1.
72 Pub. L. No. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (2006).
73 Pub. L. No. 113-27, 127 Stat. 503 (2013).
74 See Helping Heroes Fly Act § 1, 127 Stat. at 503; Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act § 1, 120 Stat.
at 2652.
75 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 22, at 454–56 (explaining the purpose of example clauses but
referring to them as “statutory lists”).
76 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 934 (quoting a drafter who said that “sometimes the lists
are in there to satisfy groups”).
71
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methodology, therefore, it is necessary to ask of any example clause: does its
rhetoric indicate that its drafters intended it to address constituents rather than
courts?
To illustrate the process that interpreters can use to answer this question,
the following pages examine two pieces of congressional legislation. For
each piece of legislation, the following pages ask two questions. First, do the
example clauses in the legislation, at the expense of legal clarity, uses language and categories that are meaningful to a specific interest group? Second,
does the most commonsense and compelling interpretation emerge when the
example clause is viewed as expressive rhetoric? By answering these questions, the following pages aim to show, interpreters can check whether an
example clause contains language that its drafters hoped would address constituents, not courts.
1.

H.R. 575

Consider the example clauses found in H.R. 575, 77 as introduced in the
113th Congress. While this bill was not reported out of committee, it nonetheless provides a helpful illustration of the drafting practices in the modern
Congress. It focuses upon a specific concern: the worry that participation by
the United States in international agreements and organizations might somehow compromise the rights afforded to individuals by the Constitution. 78 The
bill addresses this concern in two different ways. First, it expresses the sense
of Congress that, inter alia, “the United States should not adopt any treaty
that . . . abridges the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
such as the right to keep and bear arms.” 79 Second, it conditions United Nations funding upon a presidential certification that the United Nations has not
made any effort to “restrict . . . or otherwise adversely infringe on the rights
of individuals in the United States to possess a firearm or ammunition . . . or
abridge any of the other constitutionally protected rights of citizens of the
United States.” 80
Each of these two references to Second Amendment rights—references
to “the right to keep and bear arms” and to the right “to possess a firearm or
ammunition”—operates as an example clause, since each illustrates a broader
legal rule that applies to all rights under the Constitution. Does the text found
in these example clauses, then, provide persuasive evidence that the intended
audience of this text was constituents, not courts?

77

Second Amendment Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 575, 113th Cong. (2013).
Id. § 2.
79 Id. § 2(b).
80 Id. § 3(b).
78
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Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to an Interest
Group

The foregoing pages have outlined one test that can be used to answer
this question. According to this test, when the rhetoric employed in a redundancy-encouraging feature speaks in the language and categories that are
uniquely meaningful to a constituent group, even at the expense of legal clarity, this signals the possibility that the rhetoric is directed toward that constituent group rather than toward the courts.
In the case of H.R. 575, each example clause specifically references a
topic—the Second Amendment—that is extremely important to a formidable
partisan constituent group (namely, the gun lobby). The National Rifle Association, for example—which has been described in the New York Times as
“the fiercest lobby in Washington” 81—describes itself as “America’s foremost defender of Second Amendment rights.” 82 Another member of the gun
lobby, Gun Owners of America, similarly describes itself as “a non-profit
lobbying organization formed . . . to preserve and defend the Second Amendment rights of gun owners.” 83 In H.R. 575, the Member who introduced the
bill twice chose to include an example that made explicit mention of this
Second Amendment right, 84 even though these references bear an unclear relationship to the broader reference to “rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution,” thereby decreasing the legal clarity of the bill. The example
clauses in H.R. 575, therefore, use the language and categories that are deeply
meaningful to a specific constituent group, and they do so at the expense of
the legal clarity of the bill.
b.

Test #2: Comparative Strength of Competing Interpretations

A second test also is useful in the effort to determine the intended audience for example clauses. According to this test, competing interpretations
of the redundant provision are placed side-by-side: on the one hand, any interpretations that presume the provision to address the courts (as operative
legal rhetoric), and on the other hand, a competing interpretation that views
the provision as addressed to constituent groups (as expressive rhetoric).
Comparing these options, the interpreter then selects the more logical, compelling, and commonsense interpretation.

81

Gail Collins, Congress, up in Arms, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/
05/06/opinion/06gcollins.html.
82 A Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2018).
83 About Gun Owners of America, Gun Owners of Am., http://gunowners.org/protect.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
84 159 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2013) (statement of Rep. Stockman).
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Interpretation #1: Belt-and-Suspenders Function

What interpretations are available, then, of the example clauses in H.R.
575? According to one interpretation—which might be described as the
“belt-and-suspenders” interpretation—these example clauses serve no independent purpose at all. This interpretive possibility has been outlined by
Scalia and Garner, who assert that “[s]ometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of substance, either out of a
flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.” 85 Even at its most generous, this interpretive approach finds only a nominal purpose in redundancy-encouraging
features; it views these features as misguided efforts to address an anxiety
that stating a legal rule once will not suffice. As such, the “belt-and-suspenders” interpretation accepts the fact that some statutory text lacks operative
legal effect, but it refuses to consider the possibility that this rhetoric is successfully serving other rhetorical purposes in the statute.
When applied to H.R. 575, this interpretive approach views the bill’s
example clauses as serving no independent function in the statute—and thus
as violating the rule against surplusage. In order to explain this breakdown
of a semantic canon, this interpretation essentially relies on an accusation
that, in the case of H.R. 575, sloppy drafting occurred; it assumes that this
redundant text resulted from a “flawed sense of style” or an “ill-conceived”
drafting approach on the part of the statute’s drafters. 86 When an interpretation must take recourse to accusations of sloppy drafting in order to redeem
its interpretive methodology, however, it raises serious questions of whether
it might be the methodology, not the statute, that is the core problem.
ii.

Interpretation #2: Clarifying Function

A second interpretation views the example clauses in H.R. 575 as clarifying some potential ambiguity that exists in the statute’s operative legal
rule. According to this interpretation, the drafters of H.R. 575 entertained
apprehensions that the reference to “rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution” did not clearly apply to the Second Amendment. In response
to this apprehension, the argument goes, the drafters inserted the example
clauses into the statute. This interpretation views the example clauses in H.R.
575 as operative legal rhetoric, and because it discovers an operative
85

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 176–77.
See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812 (1983). (“No one would suggest that judicial opinions or academic articles
contain no surplusage; are these documents less carefully prepared than statutes? There is no evidence for
this improbable proposition; what evidence we have, much of it from the statutes themselves, is to the
contrary.”).
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function that these clauses perform, it avoids accusations of redundancy. In
this regard, the interpretation relies upon an idea also commonly seen in the
application of the ejusdem generis canon: the idea that examples are nonredundant when they clarify some aspect of a broader operative legal rule. 87
What ambiguity might exist in the reference to “rights guaranteed by
the United States Constitution,” however, that could be clarified by an additional reference to the “right to keep and bear arms”? The only serious possibility, it would seem, is that the statute’s drafters were concerned that there
might be ambiguity as to whether the reference to “the United States Constitution” applied to successful constitutional amendments. According to this
interpretation, the drafters included the reference to Second Amendment
rights in order to clarify that they did, in fact, intend to refer also to these
amendments.
There are several reasons why this interpretation is not compelling,
however. First, it interprets Congress as having devised a circuitous and unclear way to communicate a simple idea. Congress easily could have referred
to “the United States Constitution (including amendments made to such Constitution),” for example. Moreover, this interpretation ignores the fact that, in
the context of statutes, the House of Representatives follows a drafting practice whereby any reference to a statute is presumed to include amendments
made to that statute, even in the absence of a clarifying parenthetical. 88 This
presumption would be heightened only for constitutional amendments, since
the Constitution directs that such amendments “shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution.” 89
Second, this interpretation is troublingly out of step with the real-world
context that produced H.R. 575. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonprofit organization that compiles documents filed by organizations
regarding their lobbying activities, three groups lobbied with respect to H.R.
575: Gun Owners of America, National Association for Gun Rights, and the
National Rifle Association (NRA). 90 This bill was a reintroduction of a 2011
bill, and three groups had lobbied with respect to that earlier version: the
NRA, Gun Owners of America, and Citizens Committee for the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms. 91 In other words, every organization that lobbied Congress with respect to H.R. 575 is an organization that focuses specifically on
the right that is referenced in the example clauses. This perfect congruence
between lobbying activity and statutory text is unlikely to be coincidence,
and an interpretation that cannot account for it ought to be considered unconvincing.
87

See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 199–200.
DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 49.
89 U.S. CONST. art. V.
90 Clients Lobbying on H.R.575: Second Amendment Protection Act of 2013, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id=hr575-113 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
91 Clients Lobbying on H.R.3594: Second Amendment Protection Act of 2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id=hr3594-112 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
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iii. Interpretation #3: Expressive Function
Finally, the example clauses in H.R. 575 can be interpreted as expressive rhetoric. Unlike the interpretation that views the example clauses in H.R.
575 as serving a clarifying function, this interpretation is able to account for
the overlap between statutory text and lobbying activity. According to this
interpretation, rhetoric relating to the Second Amendment was inserted into
the statute in order to afford a distinct nonlegislative benefit to the groups
that lobbied with respect to H.R. 575—the benefit of seeing their specific
concern echoed in statutory text.
At the same time, an interpretation that views the example clauses in
H.R. 575 as expressive rhetoric does not suffer from the weakness observed
in the “belt-and-suspenders” interpretation, as the former does not violate the
basic principle that animates the rule against surplusage. The linguistic insight behind the rule against surplusage, it must be recalled, is that every
word and phrase generally is intended to achieve a distinct rhetorical effect,
not a distinct legal effect. 92 It is only when we layer this commonsense insight upon another presumption—the presumption that the only rhetorical effects statutes seek to achieve are operative legal effects—that we get the oftrepeated interpretive rule. The interpretation of the example clauses in H.R.
575 as expressive rhetoric does not attribute any distinctive legal effect to
these clauses. However, it does discover a unique rhetorical purpose that is
fulfilled by these clauses—a purpose that was not fulfilled by the legal rule
in the statute. In this regard, the interpretation of these example clauses as
expressive rhetoric respects the basic linguistic idea behind the rule against
surplusage. This is something that the “belt-and-suspenders” interpretation is
not able to accomplish—and, for this reason, the interpretation of the example clauses in H.R. 575 as expressive rhetoric should be viewed as preferable.
2.

Public Law 109-464

Finally, it is worthwhile to consider a subset of example clauses: multiple-item example clauses that precede a broader rule. Among statutory interpreters, this subset is treated uniquely. The ejusdem generis canon is applied
to these clauses, a canon that directs: “[W]hen a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.” 93
Why have interpreters embraced this canon? The answer to this question
is found, once again, in the rule against surplusage. The ejusdem generis
92 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 174 (“This is true not just of legal texts but of all sensible
writing: ‘Whenever a reading arbitrarily ignores linguistic components or inadequately accounts for them,
the reading may be presumed improbable.’” (quoting E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 236
(1967))).
93 Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

2018]

WHEN COURTS SHOULD IGNORE STATUTORY TEXT

477

canon ostensibly assigns a distinct operative legal function to both a broader
rule and an example clause: the rule establishes an unclear category, while
the multiple-item example clause clarifies which of the possible interpretations of the rule was intended. As such, this canon begins with a redundancyencouraging feature—an example clause—and it discovers an interpretation
of this feature that renders it nonredundant.
However, this Article has advanced another interpretive strategy that is
similarly able to interpret example clauses as nonredundant. According to
this interpretation, the example clause sends an expressive message to constituents—a function that the comprehensive statutory rule, as operative legal
rhetoric, does not accomplish. Interpreters must choose, therefore, between
two different interpretive options, each of which can explain this subset of
example clauses in a nonredundant fashion.
The two-step methodology, as outlined above, provides a reasoned way
for interpreters to make this choice. This methodology directs interpreters to
interpret statutory text as expressive rhetoric if it meets the following criteria 94:
(1) It is located in a redundancy-encouraging feature of the statute.
(2) It is designed to speak to constituents, not courts, as proven by passing the following tests:
(a) It speaks in language that is meaningful to relevant constituent
groups, and thereby sacrifices legal clarity; and
(b) A side-by-side comparison of competing interpretations finds
that the interpretation as expressive rhetoric produces a more
logical, compelling, and commonsense interpretation than does
any interpretation as operative legal rhetoric.
Consider the application of this methodology to Public Law 109-464.
This statute serves primarily to prohibit protests and other disruptions of funerals and memorial services for veterans and active members of the military. 95 The Act specifies locations within which these disruptions are not permitted, including: “a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress
from the location of such funeral.” 96 In this passage, Congress provides a list
of two specific examples: a “road [or] pathway” to a funeral. 97 At the same
94

See supra Section I.B.
18 U.S.C. § 1388(a) (2012).
96 Id. § 1388(a)(1)(A)(ii).
97 Id.
95
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time, Congress also provides a broader rule referring to “route[s] of ingress
to or egress from” such a funeral. 98 The statute thus uses a redundancy-encouraging feature, thereby satisfying step one of the two-step methodology.
This leads to the question posed by step two of the methodology: is there
persuasive evidence that the example clause is intended to address a constituent group rather than the courts? To answer this question, it first is necessary
to identify a constituent group that might plausibly be the audience for this
Act. In most instances, the constituent group will be a special-interest group;
after all, the general public usually does not have an adequate level of interest
to look into the details of specific bills, nor does the public (or even its translators in the press) necessarily have the capacity to sort through the technical
details of these statutes. Public Law 109-464 may provide an exception to
this general rule, however. This Act provided Congress’s response to a phenomenon that had received extensive national news coverage and that had
provoked national outrage: the phenomenon whereby members of the
Westboro Baptist Church, an organization that viewed the death of American
soldiers as a divine rebuke of America’s tolerance of homosexuality, would
stage loud, visible protests at military funerals while carrying signs with slogans such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “God Hates Fags.” 99 As
such, Public Law 109-464 responded not to the preferences or concerns of a
narrow interest group, but rather to widespread public indignation at the practices of the Westboro Baptist Church. 100 In this regard, the constituent group
addressed by Public Law 109-464 consisted of a public that had learned about
the protests staged by this church through various news reports. 101
a.

Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to Interest
Group

Is there compelling evidence, then, that the examples provided in the
statute are designed to address the public rather than the courts? For one
thing, the provided examples do, in fact, speak in the language and categories
that were meaningful to a public that had learned about the Westboro Baptist
Church protests through national news coverage. The examples provided in
Public Law 109-464 applied to protests staged on “road[s] [and] pathway[s].” 102 In the national news coverage of these protests, the iconic images
repeatedly presented to the public depicted Westboro Baptist Church

98

Id.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS OF 2011, 147–48 (Heather Kerrigan ed., 2013).
100 See 152 CONG. REC. H9198–99 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006).
101 At least one Member of Congress made this context explicit on the floor, mentioning the
Westboro Baptist Church by name. See id.
102 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(A)(ii).
99
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protesters lining the roads and sidewalks that led to and from military funerals. 103 These reports described protesters taunting bereaved family members
as they journeyed toward funeral sites on these pathways. 104 Statutory references to “roads [and] pathways” conjured these powerful images that the media had been depicting to the public. Moreover, these terms spoke in the everyday language that members of the public use to describe these routes—a
rhetorical contrast with the stilted reference to “ingress . . . or egress” found
in the statute’s general rule. 105
It seems logical, therefore, that the examples found in Public Law 109464 adopted language and categories that were designed to resonate with a
public that thought in those terms—and that had learned about the issue addressed by the Act through unsettling images of protesters at those specific
sites. Further, this expressive quality was achieved only through a sacrifice
in legal clarity. In particular, the reference to “pathways” is remarkably imprecise. In these regards, it is reasonable to conclude that these examples
were written with constituents, not the courts, as the intended audience.
b.

Test #2: Assessing the Comparative Strength of Competing
Interpretations

Another strategy for identifying the intended audience of statutory text
is to conduct a side-by-side comparison of competing interpretations. What
does this strategy reveal about Public Law 109-464?
i.

Interpretation #1: Expressive Rhetoric

An interpretation that regards the examples in Public Law 109-464 as
expressive rhetoric produces a commonsense interpretation that does indeed
respect the semantic canons. According to this interpretation, the examples
speak in expressive rhetoric to a general public that had become outraged by
news reports of the church’s protests, while the broader rule spoke in operative legal rhetoric to the courts. This interpretation suggests that Congress
produced a commonsense legal rule—namely, that protests would not be allowed on “route[s] of ingress to or egress from” military funerals—and it did
not violate the rule against redundancy in the process.
103

See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/17/us/17picket.html (describing Westboro Baptist
Church protesters “[s]tanding on the roadside outside [a military] funeral”); Alan Feuer, Revving Their
Engines, Remembering a War’s Toll, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/
29/nyregion/29patriot.html (depicting roadways as the site of a battle between Westboro Baptist Church
protesters and motorcycle groups attempting to drown out those protesters).
104 See Alvarez, supra note 103; Feuer, supra note 103.
105 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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Interpretation #2: Ejusdem Generis Canon

At the same time, the ejusdem generis canon also produces a commonsense interpretation that respects the semantic canons. According to this
interpretation, the examples of “roads [and] pathways” are intended to limit
the broader category of “route[s] of ingress . . . or egress.” For example,
since both roads and pathways are routes across land, it might be concluded
that these examples were intended to limit the legal rule to territorial routes
of ingress or egress. This might have implications for funerals and memorial
services held at sea, for example. Through this interpretation, the ejusdem
generis canon would have produced another commonsense interpretation of
the statute: that it prohibited protests on all overland routes of ingress to, or
egress from, military funerals. Moreover, it also arrives at this interpretation
without violating the rule against redundancy.
Both interpretations are plausible, therefore—but between these two options, the interpretation as expressive rhetoric seems more compelling. After
all, the ejusdem generis interpretation presumes that Congress took a remarkably circuitous drafting approach in order to express a relatively straightforward concept. If Congress wanted to apply a statutory rule to overland routes,
why would it not simply state this? Simply because this interpretation renders
the examples nonredundant does not mean that it also renders the interpretation reasonable. The category of overland routes is not such an ethereal, abstract notion that Congress would have difficulty articulating this rule without pointing to it obliquely through a set of examples. Put differently, the
interpretation based on the ejusdem generis canon views the statutory text as
bearing only a distant, imprecise connection to the legal rule it is trying to
articulate. By contrast, the interpretation as expressive rhetoric suffers from
no such difficulty.
E.

Implications
1.

The Ejusdem Generis Canon

As the analysis of Public Law 109-464 illustrates, an awareness of expressive rhetoric in statutes—and especially in example clauses—casts the
ejusdem generis canon in a new light. In most books and articles that discuss
the canons of statutory interpretation, the ejusdem generis canon is the only
interpretive strategy that is offered as a way to interpret the relationship between an example clause and a rule that follows it. 106 Since this canon gains
its persuasive force primarily from its ability to explain example clauses
106

See generally CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 657–70 (William N. Eskridge Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
2, at 199–213.
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without assuming that Congress violated the rule against redundancy, these
books and articles create the impression, whether intentionally or not, that
the ejusdem generis canon is unique in this ability to avoid accusations of
drafting redundancy, and that it should therefore be privileged above other
interpretive options. Once an interpreter is aware of Congress’s strategic use
of expressive rhetoric, however, the ejusdem generis canon loses its privileged status. Instead, this canon becomes one of several viable interpretive
strategies, each of which is capable of redeeming example clauses from accusations of redundancy.
2.

The Expressio Unius Canon

The presence of expressive rhetoric in statutory text also undermines
the validity of another canon: the expressio unius canon. As Black’s Law
Dictionary describes it, this canon directs: “[T]o express or include one
thing implies the exclusion of the other.” 107 Scalia and Garner argue that this
canon reflects a more general principle of language usage; according to these
authors, the canon gains much of its persuasiveness from the fact that it “validly describes how people express themselves and understand verbal expression.” 108 Other scholars, meanwhile, have disputed this claim, arguing that it
is not an accurate reflection of everyday language usage. 109
Even if the expressio unius canon is based upon an accurate presumption about the ways that people use words, however, that presumption contains an important limit: it will be true only with respect to the rhetorical end
that the word or phrase is designed to serve. When a legislator chooses to
include the phrase “right to keep and bear arms” in a statute as expressive
rhetoric, for example, a statutory interpreter may be justified in concluding
that the legislator intended to award an expressive benefit only to Second
Amendment-oriented groups, and that the legislator consequently meant to
exclude other groups (such as groups focused on First Amendment rights)
from sharing in that expressive benefit. However, this does not tell the interpreter anything about whether the legislator intended to award a legally operative benefit those latter groups. The application of the expressio unius
canon to expressive rhetoric does not tell courts anything about the proper
scope of a statute’s legally operative rule, in other words—and when courts
apply this canon to expressive rhetoric in the effort to glean some insight into
the statute’s operative legal rule, they are consistently led astray.

107

Expressio Unius Est Exclusion Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 107.
109 See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234 (1975).
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The Noscitur a Sociis Canon

The congressional practice of including expressive rhetoric in statutes
also undermines the noscitur a sociis canon. This canon directs: “The meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps.” 110 In the field of
statutory interpretation, this has been translated into a specific directive that,
in the words of Justice Stevens, “words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning.” 111
Presumably, the noscitur a sociis canon is used because statutory interpreters believe that the canon accurately describes a strategy that Congress is
using to communicate to its intended audience. Insofar as the canon requires
an interpreter to construe a term in light of a surrounding list, this canon
therefore presumes that Congress thinks about the entire list as having a single intended audience that will construe the list holistically. An awareness of
Congress’s use of expressive rhetoric reveals this presumption to be incorrect, however. Congress frequently intends that each item in a statutory list
be received by a different special-interest group, with each listed item speaking in the language and categories that are meaningful to that specific group.
In such a situation, the noscitur a sociis canon misconstrues the intent of
statutory text that is written as expressive rhetoric, and the canon should be
discarded when there is persuasive evidence that Congress is using this form
of rhetoric.
4.

Theories of Legislators

Among scholars who study the legislative process, there is ongoing debate about how best to conceptualize the relationship that exists between legislators and special-interest groups. 112 Within this debate, no school of
thought has garnered more attention than public-choice theory. 113 According
to public-choice theory, special-interest groups are the primary actors within
the political system; these groups seek benefits from legislators in order to
further their self-interests, and they constantly jockey and negotiate with
other interest groups to reach political compromises. 114 By contrast,
110

Hugh P. Macmillan, Law and Language, Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club of the
Students of the Faculty of Law in the University of Birmingham, May 1931, in LAW & OTHER THINGS
166 (1937). Lord Macmillan famously explained this as “words of a feather flock together.” See id.
111 Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977).
112 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98
Q.J. ECON. 371, 396 (1983) (noting that “successful modeling has been an elusive goal,” despite the numerous political-sector models that have been crafted).
113 See id. at 371–72 (noting some of the many scholars who have contributed to public-choice theory).
114 See, e.g., id. at 372; JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 287 (1962).
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legislators are viewed as relatively marginal and powerless actors—individuals who do little more than formalize and validate the compromises reached
by these special-interest groups. 115
Several scholars have responded to the theory’s vision of legislators by
arguing that it is reductive. 116 Legislators also have interests, these critics argue, and these interests (such as a desire to make positive contributions to
public policy) often are distinct from those held by special-interest groups. 117
The congressional practice of inserting expressive rhetoric into statutes
supports these critics, and it undermines the claims of the more strident public-choice theorists. It reveals that legislators have developed drafting tactics
that can insulate operative provisions of statutes from the expressive needs
of interest groups—drafting tactics that, by addressing interest group needs
in one portion of statutory text, thereby open up spaces elsewhere in legislative text for legislators to engage in more principled policymaking.
To appreciate this point, recall the example of H.R. 575 from the 113th
Congress. 118 Three interest groups registered as having lobbied with regard
to that bill, and all three were groups that focused exclusively upon defending
and promoting Second Amendment rights. 119 It is not difficult to imagine that
these groups desired a bill that made specific reference to Second Amendment rights. If this indeed were the case, then the legislator would be faced
with several options. One option would be simply to produce a bill that created a legal rule that applied exclusively to Second Amendment rights. This
would be in strict accordance with public-choice theorists’ understanding of
the behavior of legislators. Instead, however, the legislator chose a different
option: Representative Stockman inserted the rhetoric that the interest group
desired into a redundancy-encouraging feature of the statute. 120 In so doing,
he opened up a space within the statute—in its operative legal rhetoric—
wherein he had some autonomy to develop good policy independent of the
relevant interest groups. As Part III will further illustrate, this is indeed how
many example clauses find their way into enacted bills.
In this way, drafting strategies that make use of statutory redundancies
can be useful to legislators. Moreover, by repeatedly capitalizing on this usefulness, legislators shed light on their own goals and interests—and, in so
doing, they reveal the inadequacy of public-choice theorists’ vision of legislators. As these drafting strategies reveal, legislators possess a concern for
good governance that is in tension with their perceived need to be responsive
to interest groups. By dividing statutory text into expressive rhetoric and
115
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118 See supra Section I.D.1.
119 See supra Section I.D.1.b.ii.
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operative legal rhetoric, legislators make this tension manifest in the text of
statutes. And they also reveal the strategy that they have adopted in the effort
to manage this tension responsibly.
Once expressive rhetoric is understood as a strategy by which legislators attempt to carve out locations for good policymaking in statutes, several
interpretive canons that were criticized in the foregoing pages become even
more worrisome. In the effort to interpret all statutory text as operative legal
rhetoric, several of these canons instruct courts to interpret Congress’s expressive rhetoric as limiting or modifying Congress’s operative legal rhetoric. As this Part has argued, such an interpretation fails to accurately capture
congressional intent. Even more troubling, this interpretation consistently
fails in one particular direction: it undermines the legislator’s attempt at good
governance (as expressed in the statute’s operative legal rhetoric) by construing the statute in light of the goals sought by specific special-interest
groups (as echoed in the statute’s expressive rhetoric). Consequently, the current interpretive practices of many courts undo congressional efforts at good
governance, as these practices allow interest group politics to bleed into portions of statutory text that legislators hope to insulate from such politics. To
statutory interpreters who view interest group politics as a troubling aspect
of our political system—and, admittedly, not all scholars view it this way—
the fact that certain canons unintentionally amplify the role of these politics
should be particularly disconcerting.
Finally, viewing expressive rhetoric in relation to public-choice theory
casts new light upon another institution within Congress: the Offices of the
Legislative Counsel. Some scholars have criticized the public-choice model
by arguing that it fails to account for institutional changes that affect the behavior of legislators, thereby underappreciating new features that reduce the
impact of special-interest groups. 121 Viewed from this perspective, Congress’s choice to create the Offices of the Legislative Counsel, and to continue using these offices for drafting, can be viewed as an institutional adaptation by Congress that reduces the impact of interest groups upon statutory
text. By having its Members consult with drafting offices that are insulated
from policymaking (and therefore from the pressure of special-interest
groups), Congress has effectively created an institutional mechanism that
prods its Members, during the drafting process, to step back from the expressive rhetoric that interest groups provide and to consider the use of drafting
tactics that create opportunities for principled lawmaking. In this regard, Legislative Counsel can be understood as a structure of deliberation that Congress has created for itself that pushes it away from a dependence upon interest groups and toward principled deliberation. 122
121

See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 116, at 205 (on the complicating role of political parties).
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to incentivize or require principled deliberation. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985
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This is a very different view of Legislative Counsel from the one offered
by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman in their two-part article
on congressional drafting. 123 For these scholars, the fact that Legislative
Counsel has no policymaking authority is troubling. 124 They believe that this
lack of authority introduces a problematic disconnect into the legislative process—a disconnect between policy and statutory text. 125
For one thing, this concern underestimates the extent to which Legislative Counsel is in dialogue with policymakers during the drafting process.
More to the point, however: since policymaking now exposes institutional
actors to relentless interest-group pressure, Congress may actually view the
retention of drafting offices that lack policymaking authority as a way to institutionalize its interest in insulating statutory text from direct interest-group
pressure. If so, then the non-policy-making quality of Legislative Counsel
should be viewed as essential to its role in facilitating the principled elaboration of policy, not as a hindrance to that effort.
II.

DIRECTIVE RHETORIC

Part I argued that congressional text should be understood as using a
distinct rhetoric when it displays two important traits: it addresses a unique
(and nonjudicial) intended audience, and it speaks with a unique (and nonbinding) illocutionary force. Moreover, Part I observed that expressive rhetoric satisfies these criteria. Twenty-five years ago, meanwhile, Professor Edward L. Rubin identified another type of congressional statutory rhetoric that
sometimes satisfies both of these criteria: a rhetoric that, in keeping with Rubin’s terminology, might be referred to as directive rhetoric. 126
Since the rise of the administrative state, Rubin observes, congressional
statutes have commonly operated as “directives” that are aimed toward a particular intended audience: executive agencies. 127 Sometimes, Rubin adds,
Congress realizes that it can ensure agency compliance with these directives
even when they cannot be enforced in courts. 128 After all, Rubin points out,
Congress has other ways of achieving agency compliance with its wishes—
strategies that arise from the fact that agencies are dependent upon future
123

Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
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(2014).
124 Id. at 738.
125 Id. at 737–39.
126 Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 396–
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congressional action in many ways. 129 This means that Congress has a power
to reward or punish agencies in the future based on the extent to which the
agencies comply with Congress’s present wishes. This dynamic translates
into a distinct form of congressional power—a power to direct agencies to
take actions through rhetoric that Congress knows, or at least strongly suspects, will not be treated as legally binding by courts.
In practice, Rubin therefore observes, Congress sometimes drafts directives that do not adopt the courts as an intended audience at all. 130 Furthermore, he observes that this rhetoric sometimes speaks with an illocutionary
force that is weaker than that of a binding command. 131 As Rubin puts it,
Congress sometimes is willing to address agencies through “suggestions”
and “exhortations,” even though these expressions carry a weak illocutionary
force and therefore “bear no resemblance to court-enforceable rules.” 132 This
weaker illocutionary force can be understood, of course, as a natural outgrowth of the fact that this rhetoric does not adopt the courts as an intended
audience.
In addition to identifying the existence of this directive rhetoric in congressional statutes, Rubin also identifies a few features of statutory text that
seem to signal Congress’s intent to speak in this distinct rhetoric in statutes. 133
One such feature is the presence or absence of a judicial review provision. 134
He also notes that the insertion of text into a preamble (such as in a findings
section, or a statement of congressional purpose), as opposed to in an operative provision, might be taken to signal a congressional intent that its directives be interpreted merely as “nonbinding suggestions.” 135 Beyond this,
however, Rubin mostly discusses directive rhetoric as a congressional reality
without providing guidance to interpreters who seek to pinpoint its presence
within statutes. 136
This Part updates and revises Rubin’s observations, revealing the unnoticed drafting tactics that Congress uses to signal its switch into directive
rhetoric. Here, it shows that Congress often oscillates between operative legal rhetoric and directive rhetoric within a single provision of a statute. It
also shows that Congress sometimes signals its use of directive rhetoric
129 As Rubin says: “Every year, the SEC must come to Congress for its funding and with its money
there naturally come a fair number of instructions. This basic power of Congress over the agencies it has
created is supplemented by an array of others: the power to enact amending legislation that runs counter
to the agency’s interests; to refuse to enact amending legislation that the agency desires; to confirm, reject,
or hassle presidential nominees to the agency; and to subject the members of the agency to agonizing
oversight hearings. All these possibilities enable the members of Congress to exercise considerable power
over the agency’s operations and thus over the substantive area of the initial legislation.” Id. at 392.
130 Id. at 380.
131 Id. at 381.
132 Rubin, supra note 126, at 420.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 415.
135 Id. at 411.
136 See id. at 420–22.
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through its use of modal verbs that, by their plain meaning, only communicate the illocutionary force of a nonbinding directive. In this regard, Congress
uses statutory text in much the same way that it uses committee reports for
appropriations bills—reports that similarly speak only with the force of a
nonbinding suggestion. Finally, this Part argues that Congress sometimes
uses the same drafting tactics to insert directive rhetoric into statutes as it
uses to insert expressive rhetoric into these statutes: it is making use of redundancy-encouraging features.
A.

Drafting Tactic: Modal Verbs

Congress has developed several drafting tactics that it uses to signal its
intent to speak in directive rhetoric. One such tactic is relatively straightforward: Congress communicates the nonbinding character of its directives
through the use of verbs that, to borrow a term from linguistics, have the
modality of a nonbinding directive. Within linguistics, modality is the term
used to describe the illocutionary force that, by its plain meaning, attaches to
a verb phrase. 137 For example, the terms shall, should, and may differ in their
modality. 138 Similarly, the terms commands, suggests, and permits describe
actions that vary in their modality. 139 When Congress uses verb phrases that
express a nonbinding modality, there is good reason to think that Congress
does not intend for the provisions that are introduced by the verb phrase to
be implemented by the courts as binding legal rhetoric.
Generally, these verb phrases not only express the modality of a nonbinding directive, but they also are addressed to the executive agencies over
which Congress has suggestive power. In such instances, it is reasonable to
think that Congress indeed attempts to offer a nonbinding directive or recommendation to the agency—which is to say, that Congress intends to speak
in directive rhetoric.
1.

Committee Reports for Appropriations Bills

This interpretation of nonbinding modalities in congressional statutes
gains support from their use in another type of congressional text: the committee reports that accompany appropriations bills. As several scholars have
observed, committee reports assume a unique importance in Congress when
137 Speech-act theorists would refer to verbs with different modalities as “illocutionary force indicating devices[s]”—which is to say, as verbs that intrinsically carry and communicate a distinct illocutionary force. JOHN R. SEARLE & DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 2
(1985).
138 See id. at 100–01 (discussing degrees of strength in directives).
139 See id.
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they are produced for appropriations bills. 140 In many instances, the appropriations committee wishes to specify how appropriated funds are to be spent
by the agencies that will receive these funds. This objective is not easily realized, however, because such specification is considered a new act of legislation, and House and Senate rules prohibit the insertion of new legislation
into appropriations bills. 141 As a result, a practice has emerged whereby Congress regularly uses committee reports as a location in which to express its
preferences for how appropriated funds will be used by agencies. 142
Importantly, multiple nonpartisan congressional offices routinely advise Congress that these committee reports do not function as operative legal
rhetoric. The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), for example, has
advised:
The rule, simply stated, is this: Restrictions on a lump-sum appropriation contained in the
agency’s budget request or in legislative history are not legally binding on the department or
agency unless they are carried into (specified in) the appropriation act itself, or unless some
other statute restricts the agency’s spending flexibility. 143

Similarly, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) repeatedly has
advised Congress that, as one CRS report put it: “Committee reports and
managers’ statements do not have statutory force; departments and agencies
are not legally bound by their declarations.” 144
Appropriations committees clearly are aware of this prevailing view.
The aforementioned CRS report is available through the Senate’s website,
for example, and the GAO volume asserts (and provides evidence to support
its claim) that “Congress is fully aware of these dynamics.” 145
If Congress does not believe that the specifications found in these committee reports will be legally binding, then why does it repeatedly insert this
language into the committee reports? The GAO answers this question by
pointing toward the main implementation mechanism that Rubin identifies:
140

Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 980–82; Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 132–34 (2012).
141 CLERK OF THE H.R., 115TH CONG., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES XXI(2);
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE XVI(2), S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013).
142 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 113-416, at 16 (2014) (four times urging the Department of Defense to
use appropriated funds for specific purposes).
143 2 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW 6-6 (3d ed. 2004), http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d06382sp.pdf.
144 SANDY STREETER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-518 GOV, EARMARKS AND LIMITATIONS IN
APPROPRIATIONS BILLS 2 (2004), https://archives-democrats-rules.house.gov/archives/98-518.pdf; see
also CLINTON T. BRASS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34648, BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICY
REGARDING CONGRESSIONALLY ORIGINATED EARMARKS: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2008), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc795680/ (stating that committee reports by appropriations committees
are “not legally binding”).
145 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 143, at 6–7.
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the threat that Congress might, at a later date, exact retribution against the
agency for such noncompliance through the denial of funding. 146 In support
of this answer, the GAO volume quotes from (among other sources) a 1973
House Appropriations Committee report that made this dynamic between
Congress and executive agencies explicit, which said:
“In a strictly legal sense, the Department of Defense could utilize the funds appropriated for
whatever programs were included under the individual appropriation accounts, but the relationship with the Congress demands that the detailed justifications which are presented in support of budget requests be followed. To do otherwise would cause Congress to lose confidence
in the requests made and probably result in reduced appropriations or line item appropriation
bills.” 147

The CRS report similarly adds: “[These committee reports] frequently
have effect because departments and agencies must justify their budget requests annually to the Appropriations Committees.” 148
The nonpartisan offices of Congress therefore interpret these committee
reports as directive rhetoric. These offices understand the committee reports
to speak with the illocutionary force of a threatening suggestion, not of a
binding command, and they view the agencies, not courts, as the sole audience of the reports. To the extent that Congress is believed to take seriously
the opinions of its nonpartisan offices, therefore, Congress ought to be
viewed as using these committee reports as a location for directive rhetoric.
Several important lessons emerge from this understanding of appropriations committee reports. For example, consider the intentionalist argument
recently advanced by Professor Victoria Nourse, 149 and also by Professors
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman. 150 These scholars have noted that
committee reports serve as an important location wherein Congress expresses
its intent regarding appropriations. 151 Based solely on this observation, these
scholars have suggested that courts ought to give legal force to the preferences expressed in these committee reports. 152 Each article has justified this

146 Id. (reprinting a quote from ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 238 (2000)).
147 Id. at 6–8 (quoting REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF THE 1974
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL, H.R. REP. NO. 93-662, at 16 (1973)).
148 STREETER, supra note 144, at 2.
149 Nourse, supra note 140, at 133–37.
150 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 980, 982. Gluck and Bressman are careful not to embrace
the intentionalist model that they outline; rather, they argue that, to the extent an interpreter believes in
the faithful agent theory of the judicial role in statutory interpretation, that interpreter should reach certain
conclusions based on the results of their study. Id. at 988 (explaining that “[f]aithful agency . . . does
provide a helpful lens through which to view our findings”).
151 Id. at 980–82.
152 See id. at 988–89.
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suggestion by arguing that, in so doing, courts would capture congressional
intent. 153
This suggestion makes sense if every expression of congressional intent
is taken to be an expression of operative legal intent. Once it is understood
that Congress uses legislation (and its accompanying materials) to speak to
different audiences with different illocutionary forces, by contrast, it becomes clear that these committee reports, even if they do express one type of
congressional intent, do not actually aim to address the courts as their intended audience. As such, an awareness of Congress’s directive rhetoric reveals that the Court’s disregard for appropriations committee reports, as seen
in landmark cases such as Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 154 is actually
more faithful to congressional intent than these scholars suggest. 155
Committee reports for appropriations bills can be instructive for interpreters of statutory text, moreover, as they reveal the drafting tactics that
Congress uses to signal a switch into directive rhetoric. In these reports, Congress does not use language that attempts to speak in an operative legal rhetoric that, according to GAO and CRS, these reports cannot bear. Instead,
these reports consistently articulate their directives with verbs that, by their
plain meaning, express a modality of nonbinding suggestion. In each report,
the appropriations committee “urges,” 156 “encourages,” 157 and “recommends” 158 certain uses of funds. Similarly, these reports do not prohibit nonspecified uses of funds; instead, they usually observe that the committee “is
concerned” by past agency practices that have used the funds to different
ends. 159
The use of a suggestive modality in these committee reports offers an
important lesson to statutory interpreters. It teaches that Congress associates
this modality with directive rhetoric—and, specifically, with the alternative,
nonjudicial means of enforcing that rhetoric that Congress has at its disposal.

153

See id. at 989.
437 U.S. 153 (1978). Put differently, the Court in Tennessee Valley Authority perhaps shows an
appropriate level of deference to the committee report, even though it may arrive at this deference for the
wrong reasons.
155 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 981–82; Nourse, supra note 140, at 133.
156 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 113-416, at 16 (2014) https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/hrpt416/CRPT
-113hrpt416.pdf (four times “urg[ing]” the Department of Defense to use funds in specified ways).
157 See, e.g., id. at 40–41 (six times “encourag[ing]” the Department of Veterans Affairs to use funds
in specified ways).
158 See, e.g., id. at 25 (“recommend[ing]” that the Department of Defense use funds in specified
ways).
159 See, e.g., id. at 17 (twice mentioning that Congress “is concerned” by Department of Defense
actions).
154
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The Mandatory-Permissive Canon and the Congressional
“Should”

Congress does not confine its use of these verbs (i.e., verbs that express
a nonbinding modality) to committee reports. These verbs also are present
within the operative text of congressional statutes. In particular, Congress
uses a specific modal auxiliary verb: “should.” 160 Despite its location within
statutory text, this verb clearly echoes the use of similar verbs in appropriations committee reports, where its use reflects Congress’s awareness that it
is addressing agencies through directive rhetoric.
Consider the example found in the National Foundation on Fitness,
Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act, a statute that establishes a nonprofit
corporation focused on physical fitness. 161 The Act specifies that the corporation it created “shall have a governing Board of Directors” that “shall consist of 9 members each of whom shall be a United States citizen.” 162 At the
same time, it also provides that three of these board members “should be
knowledgeable or experienced” 163 in physical fitness and that six of the board
members “should be leaders in the private sector.” 164 It similarly provides:
“The membership of the Board, to the extent practicable, should represent
diverse professional specialties relating to the achievement of physical fitness through regular participation in programs of exercise, sports, and similar
activities, or to nutrition.” 165 Here, Congress is distinguishing traits the Board
shall possess from those it should—a distinction that is underscored by Congress’s mention that the Secretary ought to pursue the final item only “to the
extent practicable.” 166 Congress continues this distinction, moreover, stating:
“Within 90 days from the date of enactment of this Act, the members of the
Board shall be appointed by the Secretary in accordance with this subsection.
In selecting individuals for appointments to the Board, the Secretary should
consult with [majority and minority leaders of Congress].” 167
In this statute, the proximity of the terms “shall” and “should” underscores that the variation in modality is intentional. As textualist scholars
acknowledge, the rule of consistent usage (along with its companion, the rule
of meaningful variation) is most compelling when the statutory terms at issue
160

For examples of this use of “should” in statutes enacted in the 115th Congress, see 22 U.S.C. §§
2152j-1(c), 7814(a)(6) (2012); John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 226(b)(3), 132 Stat. 1636, 1686 (2018).
161 National Foundation on Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-332,
§ 2(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 3576, 3576 (2010).
162 Id. § 3(a), 124 Stat. at 3576 (emphasis added).
163 Id. § 3(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 3576 (emphasis added).
164 Id. § 3(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 3577 (emphasis added).
165 Id. § 3(a), 124 Stat. at 3577 (emphasis added).
166 Id. (emphasis added).
167 § 3(b), 124 Stat. at 3577 (emphasis added).
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are proximate to each other. 168 In statutes such as the National Foundation on
Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act, where Congress oscillates
between two terms even within the same subsection, it must be presumed that
Congress included this variation for a reason. Yet the only variation between
these two terms is their modality—one uses a modality that speaks with the
illocutionary force of a command, while another speaks with the force of
suggestion.
Another example is found in the National Fish Hatchery System Volunteer Act of 2006. 169 Section 6(b) of the Act provides that “the Secretary of
the Interior may . . . develop or enhance hatchery educational programs as
appropriate.” 170 Here, the context is a broad delegation of authority to an
agency; the Secretary is not required to develop these educational programs,
and in the event that the Secretary decides to develop the programs, the Secretary has broad latitude to do so “as appropriate.” 171 Against this broadly
permissive backdrop, § 6(b) then adds: “In developing and implementing
each program, the Secretary should cooperate with State and local education
authorities, and may cooperate with partner organizations in accordance with
subsection (d).” 172
Here, the proximity of the terms “may” and “should” once again underscores the intentional way in which Congress varies the modality of its auxiliary verbs. In this instance, Congress highlights the distinction between a
grant of permission (as denoted by the verb “may”) and a directive (as denoted by the verb “should”). Once again, the conclusion must be that Congress is using the latter term to achieve an intermediate illocutionary force—
one that directive rhetoric can bear in statutes on account of Congress’s nonjudicial enforcement mechanisms.
This use of “should” also highlights another point: that Congress commonly uses directive rhetoric in situations in which Congress is otherwise
providing an agency with great flexibility in its task of carrying out a statutory program. In this regard, directive rhetoric is a drafting tactic that Congress has developed as a response to a feature of post–New Deal statutes
identified by Rubin. In the modern administrative state, Rubin notes, the effectiveness of a statute often is determined primarily by its effectiveness in
providing clear, workable instructions to an agency, a goal not always best
achieved through rhetoric that has the specificity of binding legal rhetoric. 173
In the pairing of broad operative legal rhetoric with more specific directive
rhetoric, Congress uses a drafting tactic that responds to this reality by attempting to strike a unique balance between guidance and flexibility in its
instructions to agencies.
168
169
170
171
172
173

See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 172–73.
16 U.S.C. § 760aa-4 (2012).
Id. § 760aa-4(b) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Rubin, supra note 14, at 388.
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For those who continue to neglect Rubin’s observations about modern
legislation, meanwhile, this congressional use of the term “should” once
again disproves the presumption that all statutory text is written as operative
legal rhetoric. This point is nicely distilled in the way that Congress’s use of
the term “should” responds to the canon of construction that Justice Scalia
and Professor Bryan A. Garner label as the “Mandatory/Permissive
Canon.” 174 According to this canon, Scalia and Garner explain, attention to
the terms “shall” and “may” allows statutory interpreters to “identify[] which
words are mandatory and which permissive.” 175 In the textualist world inhabited by Scalia and Garner, it seems, statutory text always speaks in one of
these two voices; consequently, the authors perceive the interpreter’s task
simply as the sorting of one voice from the other. As such, the “Mandatory/Permissive Canon” cannot account for Congress’s use of an intermediate level of illocutionary force in statutory text—a use clearly seen in the
insertion of the term “should” into congressional statutes. By contrast, if we
presume that Congress is using directive rhetoric in its use of the term
“should,” then passages employing this term become easily explicable.
B.

Drafting Tactic: Example Clauses

There is another drafting tactic that Congress uses to insert directive
rhetoric into statutes—a tactic that, as Part I illustrated, Congress also uses
with expressive rhetoric. Using redundancy-encouraging features, Congress
bifurcates its statutory directive—in this case, to address the courts through
operative legal rhetoric and to guide an agency with directive rhetoric. In
particular, Congress often will use a specific redundancy-encouraging feature—the example clause—to accomplish this bifurcation.
A useful example of this drafting tactic is found in the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act of 1998. 176 This Act required the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to make payments, to the extent that funds were
available, to individuals who had contracted HIV through the administration
of a contaminated antihemophilic factor. 177 Section 1(a) of the Act specified
the individuals who were to receive these payments, and it included any individual who “has any form of blood-clotting disorder, such as hemophilia,”
and who was treated with antihemophilic factor during a specified period. 178
In this provision, Congress therefore provided a single-item example clause
(found in its reference to “hemophilia”). How should this example clause be
interpreted?

174

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 112.
Id.
176 Pub. L. No. 105-369, 112 Stat. 3368 (1998).
177 Id. § 102(a), 112 Stat. at 3369.
178 Id.
175
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Consider an interpretation that acknowledges Congress’s use of directive rhetoric. According to this interpretation, Congress used operative
legal rhetoric to outline a broad legal rule applying to all individuals with
“blood-clotting disorder[s].” At the same time, Congress used directive rhetoric to suggest its core concern and preferred application to the implementing
agency—an application that prioritized treatment for individuals with “hemophilia.” From this perspective, Congress is seen as affording the agency
the flexibility to apply the program to individuals beyond those who are Congress’s core concern—namely, to individuals who are similarly situated to
hemophiliacs, but who technically possess a different form of blood-clotting
disorder (and, indeed, the agency did ultimately apply this policy to individuals with at least one analogous disorder). 179 At the same time, Congress directed the agency toward its preferred application to hemophiliacs.
This is a superior interpretation from both textualist and intentionalist
perspectives. First, consider the textualist perspective. Textualists likely
would apply the semantic canons of interpretation to this passage, thereby
hoping to discover an interpretation that accords with the principles of everyday language usage. The textualist interpreter might wonder: is it possible
that the example of “hemophilia” clarifies an ambiguity in the term “bloodclotting disorder”? If so, this example would serve a clarifying function that
would redeem it from redundancy. Unfortunately for the textualist, however,
hemophilia is the paradigmatic example of a blood-clotting disorder, not a
contestable, borderline application. The National Institutes of Health, for example, defines hemophilia as a “bleeding disorder in which the blood doesn’t
clot normally.” 180 This would leave only the conclusion that the statute violates the rule against redundancy.
By contrast, an interpretation that views the reference to hemophiliacs
as directive rhetoric not only makes sense of the statutory text, but it also
does so while presuming that Congress did not violate the everyday language
practices that are distilled in the semantic canons. Indeed, notice how the
canons of interpretation fall into place once the example clause is treated as
directive rhetoric. First, this interpretation respects the plain meaning of Congress’s broad statement that its policy applies to “any form of blood-clotting
disorder.” 181 In this regard, it differs from any interpretation that attempts to
use the reference to “hemophilia” to narrow the legally binding rule relating
to individuals with blood-clotting disorders.
Second, it respects the rule on meaningful variation, as it acknowledges
Congress’s decision not to introduce its example clause with the term “including,” but rather to speak of blood-clotting disorders “such as
179 Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Program, 42 C.F.R. § 130.2(c) (2016) (describing application
to von Williebrand’s disease).
180 Hemophilia, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST., https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health-topics/hemophilia (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
181 § 102(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 3369 (emphasis added).
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hemophilia.” In congressional drafting, the phrase “such as” is specifically
used in distinction to the phrase “including.” 182 As Scalia and Garner’s “Presumption of Nonexclusive ‘Include’” canon explains, the term “including” is
commonly understood to be binding with respect to those items that are specifically mentioned in the statute as “included” within a catchall. 183 By contrast, the phrase “such as” suggests no such binding quality. 184 In this regard,
while “including” carries a legal force equivalent to “shall,” the phrase “such
as” carries a suggestive force equivalent to that found in the term “should.”
Third, this interpretation respects the rule of consistent usage, since
Congress only inserted references to hemophilia into redundancy-encouraging features within the statute. These references appear only in the short title
of the Act, in title and section headings, in the name of the relief fund the Act
creates, and in example clauses. 185 Finally, this interpretation respects the rule
against surplusage, as it discovers a distinct rhetorical function that is performed by each portion of statutory text.
Moreover, interpreting the reference to individuals with “hemophilia”
as directive rhetoric also produces a superior interpretation from an intentionalist perspective. According to the committee report, the central goal of
the Act is to provide “assistance to the hemophilia community,” not necessarily to a larger population of individuals with blood-clotting disorders. 186
At the same time, however, this report also said that payments would be
available under the Act to “an individual with a blood-clotting disorder who
used anti-hemophilic factor.” 187 According to the committee’s own account,
therefore, the committee possessed a policymaking intent to address a core
concern regarding the hemophiliac community—yet it was consciously approving statutory text that it understood to create a broader legal rule relating
to individuals with blood-clotting disorders. 188
Any interpretation that presumes policymakers to possess a single “intent,” and that turns to committee reports of this Act in search of that intent,
will struggle to make sense of this legislative history. An interpretation that
views these policymakers as oscillating between operative legal intent and
directive intent, however, can easily understand this legislative history as a
faithful explication of the policies embedded in the statutory text.

182

From the Author’s experience drafting legislation in the House of Representatives, this rule is
taught as part of the training of new drafting attorneys. See also DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 62
(“In definitions, ‘means’ should be used for establishing complete meanings and ‘includes’ when the purpose is to make clear that a term includes a specific matter.”).
183 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 132.
184 Cf. DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 62–63 (describing “such” as demonstrative and generally avoided, while defining “include” as “to make clear”).
185 See §§ 1(a), 101(a), 102(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 3368–69.
186 H.R. REP. NO. 105-465, pt. 1, at 7 (1998) (emphasis added) (providing a detailed narrative of the
conditions that gave rise to the legislation and speaking exclusively about individuals with hemophilia).
187 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
188 See id.
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III. EXPRESSIVE-DIRECTIVE RHETORIC
In some instances, Congress also drafts an example clause that is designed to serve an expressive-directive function—which is to say, an example
clause that is designed to operate as both expressive rhetoric and directive
rhetoric.
A.

Denali National Park Improvement Act

Consider an example from the Denali National Park Improvement
Act. 189 Among other things, this Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to issue permits for certain hydroelectric projects—referred to in the Act as
“microhydro projects”—within the Denali National Park and Preserve. 190 In
the Act, the definition of “microhydro projects” specifies that this term includes “intake pipelines, including the intake pipeline located on Eureka
Creek, approximately ½ mile upstream from the Park Road.” 191 In this definitional phrase, the reference to the specific intake pipeline on Eureka Creek
provides an example clause, since it illustrates the operative legal rule relating generally to “intake pipelines.” Consequently, it is located in a redundancy-encouraging feature of a statute. This raises the question: does the
clause also display the second hallmark of expressive rhetoric by appearing
to address constituents, not courts? Moreover, does it display the second hallmark of directive rhetoric—appearing to make suggestions to agencies, not
binding rules for judges?
1.

Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to Interest Group

First, consider the possibility that this example clause contains expressive rhetoric. The initial inquiry is whether the example clause uses language
and categories that are meaningful to specific interest groups, and whether it
does so at the expense of legal clarity. To answer this question, consider a
statement made by Stephen E. Whitesell, an employee of the National Park
Service, regarding an early draft of the Act. In 2011, Whitesell offered a
statement to a subcommittee of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee. 192 In that statement, Whitesell acknowledged that efforts to ratify
189

Pub. L. No. 113-33, 127 Stat. 514 (2013).
Id. § 2(b), 127 Stat. at 514.
191 Id. § 2(a)(4)(B)(i), 127 Stat. at 514.
192 Various National Parks Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks of the Comm. on
Energy and Nat. Res., 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (statement of Stephen E. Whitesell, Assoc. Dir., Park Planning, Facilities, and Lands, Nat’l Park Serv., Dep’t of the Interior), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-112shrg70701/pdf/CHRG-112shrg70701.pdf [hereinafter Various National Parks Bills Hearing].
190
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hydroelectric projects in Denali National Park and Preserve had begun as an
attempt to appease a special-interest group: a company named Doyon Tourism, Incorporated (Doyon). 193 This company, Whitesell explained, had “requested permits from the [National Park Service] to install a micro-hydroelectric project on Eureka Creek,” permits that the Park Service did not have
authority to grant. 194 Whitesell then explained that certain elements of the
statute’s text clearly were tailored to this specific interest group—including
the element defining “micro-hydro projects.” 195 How did this early version of
the Act, then, define “microhydro projects” in the effort to cater to this special-interest group? It did so by referring exclusively to the site at which
Doyon wanted to install its project, defining “microhydro projects” as projects that used “the intake pipeline located on Eureka Creek, approximately
½ mile upstream from the Park Road, as depicted on the map.” 196 In other
words, the definition in the early version of the bill contained only the example clause found in the final Act. According to Whitesell, it did so because
this language was specifically tailored to the interests of a special-interest
group. 197 Quite clearly, then, the example clause in the final version of the
Act—a clause that retained this early draft language verbatim—spoke in the
language and categories that were meaningful to a special-interest group.
Moreover, Whitesell observed, this definitional language in the early
version of the bill addressed Doyon’s specific interest only at the expense of
the legal clarity of the bill. 198 As Whitesell explained, language elsewhere in
the bill suggested that the Park Service would have broader authority to permit hydroelectric projects in the park beyond the one sought by Doyon. 199 By
defining “microhydro projects” by reference to the specific pipeline to be
used for the Doyon project, Whitesell feared, the reference to this Eureka
Creek pipeline might confuse or undermine the Park Service’s broader authority. 200 This would be equally true when the phrase was retained as an
example clause, of course. The result was an example clause that sacrificed
legal clarity in order to use terms that were meaningful to a specific interest
group—a hallmark of expressive rhetoric.

193

Id. at 31.
Id. (emphasis added).
195 As Whitesell put it, “various elements of the bill as introduced appear to apply solely to a project
by Doyon.” Id. at 32.
196 § 2(a)(4)(B)(i), 127 Stat. at 514.
197 See Various National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 192, at 32 (statement of Stephen E. Whitesell).
198 Id.
199 See id. at 31–32.
200 See id.
194
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Test #2: Comparative Strength of Competing Interpretations

This interpretation of the example clause as expressive rhetoric is reinforced by the second interpretive strategy for identifying this rhetoric: the
strategy of assessing the comparative strength of various competing interpretations.
a.

Interpretation #1: Clarifying Function

Two possible interpretations view the example clause as serving a clarifying function. Under one such interpretation, the example clause and the
legal rule work in tandem to make clear that the fixture located at Eureka
Creek was to be regarded as an intake pipeline. This can be referred to as the
“Eureka-clarifying interpretation.” Under another, the example clause clarifies that only fixtures substantially similar to the Eureka Creek fixture are to
be regarded as intake pipelines. This can be referred to as the “pipeline-clarifying interpretation.” According to these interpretations, the example clause
would settle a debate, or resolve an ambiguity, either about the scope and
meaning of the term “intake pipeline” or about the proper categorization of
the pipeline at Eureka Creek. In either instance, the example clause would
thereby be transformed into nonredundant operative legal rhetoric.
There are problems with each of these interpretations, however. First,
consider the Eureka-clarifying interpretation. This interpretation relies on the
mistaken idea that there were ambiguities or uncertainties about whether the
pipeline at Eureka Creek would constitute an “intake pipeline.” Doyon
clearly felt that the Eureka Creek pipeline was an “intake pipeline,” since its
preferred statutory language labeled it as such. 201 The Park Service obviously
agreed with this assessment, since a Park Service representative stated in subcommittee testimony that a simple reference to “intake pipelines” would allow for permits to be awarded to Doyon. 202 In other words, there was consensus, not ambiguity, about whether the Eureka Creek pipeline constituted an
“intake pipeline.” Moreover, there was no reason for Doyon to fear that a
more hostile administration might later reverse this interpretation—the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior discretion to decide whether to award
permits at all. 203 So if a hostile Secretary wished to avoid issuing permits to
Doyon, such a Secretary would not need to adopt a narrow interpretation of
“intake pipelines” in order to achieve this end. Consequently, an interpretation that views the example clause as an attempt to clarify an ambiguity about
the status of the Eureka Creek pipeline is grounded in a false theory about
the concerns that shaped this clause.
201

Cf. id. at 31–32.
See id. at 32.
203 Denali National Park Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-33, § 2(b)(1), 127 Stat. 514, 515 (2013).
202
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Next, consider the pipeline-clarifying interpretation. This interpretation
views the reference to the Eureka Creek pipeline as narrowing the broader
reference to “intake pipelines,” restricting that reference so that it applies
only to pipelines that are substantially similar to the pipeline at Eureka Creek.
This interpretation is troubling because it assigns to the statute an odd policy
that none of the relevant parties were requesting. As the foregoing pages explained, Doyon sought a policy that would have allowed the Park Service to
grant a permit at the Eureka Creek intake pipeline. Meanwhile, Whitesell explained, the Park Service also wanted the authority to pursue other hydroelectric projects in Denali Park. 204 In the effort to effectuate that policy, Whitesell proposed striking the specific reference to the intake pipeline located on
Eureka Creek and replacing it with a simple, broad reference to “intake pipelines.” 205
Consider Congress’s situation in light of these facts. It had a specialinterest group clamoring for the right to conduct a specific project. It had an
agency requesting broader authority so that it not only could allow that special-interest group’s project to proceed, but also could also award permits for
all projects relating to “intake pipelines.” According to the interpretation of
the example clause as narrowing the broader legal rule, Congress settled on
a middle-ground policy that none of the parties were requesting—a policy
whereby the broad category of “intake pipelines” was somehow to be limited
by the example of the Eureka Creek pipeline. This interpretation of congressional intent is not entirely farfetched. Yet it does not present Congress as
possessing a policy intent that was responsive, in a nuanced and detailed
manner, to the feedback it was receiving from agencies and interest groups.
In this regard, it is not compelling.
b.

Interpretation #2: Expressive and Directive Function

Another possible interpretation views the example clause as expressivedirective rhetoric. According to this interpretation, Congress used operative
legal rhetoric to award the Park Service with broad permitting authority that
extended to all “intake pipelines” located within Denali National Park and
Preserve, including the Eureka Creek pipeline. At the same time, Congress
wanted to assure the special-interest group whose project had given rise to
the bill that its project would not be neglected or delayed due to this broader
policy decision. Consequently, Congress added a specific reference to this
interest group’s project in an example clause. In so doing, it inserted directive
rhetoric that sent a message to the Park Service, informing the agency that
Congress expected to see the special-interest group’s project given priority
and unique attention within the permitting process. At the same time, this
language also functioned as expressive rhetoric, allowing the special-interest
204
205

Various National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 192, at 31–32.
Id. at 32.
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group to see its specific language incorporated into law—thereby assuring
this group that Congress was attentive to its interests, was responsive, and
was monitoring the agency to ensure that the group received the permit.
Under this interpretation, Congress gave each entity precisely what it
sought. The Park Service received categorical authority to issue permits regarding intake pipelines. At the same time, Doyon received not only a pathway to obtain its requested permit, but also statutory reassurance that its permit would be given priority by the Park Service.
Unlike the Eureka-clarifying interpretation, this expressive-directive interpretation is not predicated upon a false theory about statutory ambiguities
that troubled the statute’s drafters and key beneficiaries. Unlike the pipelineclarifying interpretation, this expressive-directive interpretation credits Congress with developing a policy that responded intelligently to the feedback it
received from the two interested parties (the Park Service and Doyon). In this
sense, a side-by-side comparison of competing interpretations reveals that,
once the example clause is viewed as expressive-directive rhetoric, a more
compelling and commonsense interpretation of the example clause
emerges—one that credits Congress with responsive, nuanced policymaking
and with error-free statutory drafting.
B.

Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act

Another example clause that contains expressive-directive rhetoric is
found in the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness
Act. 206 This Act amended the Public Health Service Act to permit the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award grants, contracts, or cooperative
agreements to provide information to women whose born or unborn children
have been diagnosed, in the words of the statute, with “Down syndrome, or
other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions.” 207 Specifically, the Act
sought to provide these women with “up-to-date information on the range of
outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition, including
physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes,” and also
to provide these women with “key support services.” 208 In this Act, the reference to “Down syndrome” operates as an example clause illustrating the statutory rule relating to “prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions.” 209

206

Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008).
Id. § 2(1), 122 Stat. at 4051.
208 Id.
209 “Down syndrome” also is a defined term in the statute—a fact which means that this term is used
in two different redundancy-encouraging features (since defined terms are redundant with the definitions
of those terms). See sec. 3, § 399R(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 4051.
207
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Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to Interest Group

Does the statutory text, then, adopt the language and categories of special-interest groups—in particular, of groups that took an interest in the bill
prior to its passage? According to its website, the National Down Syndrome
Society “spearheaded the effort to help pass” the Act. 210 Similarly, Down
Syndrome Affiliates in Action, a collection of five organizations that each
focuses specifically on Down syndrome, advocated on behalf of funding for
the bill in the wake of its passage, 211 as did the National Association for Down
Syndrome. 212 Clearly, a host of special-interest groups were interested in this
bill—groups that had a unique investment in the specific category of “Down
syndrome.”
2.

Test #2: Comparative Strength of Competing Interpretations

What additional light is shed on this example clause, then, by a side-byside comparison of the two competing interpretations of the reference to
Down syndrome?
a.

Interpretation #1: Clarifying Function

First, consider an interpretation that regards the example of “Down syndrome” as operative legal rhetoric. In this instance, each key term in the legal
rule—“prenatally diagnosed condition” as well as “postnatally diagnosed
condition”—is a defined term in the statute. 213 This fact undercuts any argument that Congress inserted the example of “Down syndrome” to clarify or
narrow the terms found in the legal rule, since Congress already relied on a
different drafting tactic to clarify these concepts.
Additionally, the drafting history of this Act reveals that the focus on
Down syndrome was a starting point for this legislation, not a focus that was
added to clarify a preexisting concept. 214 The impetus for the Act came from
several articles written by Brian Skotko, the Co-Director of the Down

210 Our History, NDSS: NAT’L DOWN SYNDROME SOC’Y, http://www.ndss.org/About-NDSS/
NDSS-History/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
211 Affiliates in Action, DOWN SYNDROME AFFILIATES IN ACTION, 1 (Feb. 26, 2009), https://mcmorris.house.gov/uploads/February2009AIAPolicySummary.pdf.
212 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, NAT’L ASS’N FOR DOWN
SYNDROME, https://www.nads.org/programs/governmental-affairs/prenatally-and-postnatally-diagnosedconditions-awareness-act/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
213 42 U.S.C. §§ 280g-8(a)(3) to (4) (2012).
214 See 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
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Syndrome Program at Massachusetts General Hospital, 215 and from articles
in the Wall Street Journal 216 and the New York Times. 217 These articles suggested that women who received a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome often were provided with a bleak portrait of the life that awaited them and their
children. 218 The articles linked this bleak portrait to the exceedingly high percentage of such women who elect to terminate the pregnancy. 219 These articles apparently were brought to the attention of Senator Brownback, a famously pro-life Senator, who drafted and introduced the Act as a response to
these findings. 220 This suggests that the reference to “Down syndrome” in the
Act was not inserted to clarify a larger category of conditions. Rather, it suggests that this reference was inserted because of a specific and intense interest
in this particular issue.
b.

Interpretation #2: Expressive and Directive Function

By contrast, an interpretation that views the example of “Down syndrome” as expressive rhetoric easily explains the distinct rhetorical purpose
of this term. There is good reason, therefore, to conclude that the reference
to “Down syndrome” was intended to operate as expressive rhetoric.
Moreover, there is equally compelling evidence to conclude that this
reference was intended to function simultaneously as directive rhetoric. First,
the example clause appears within a statute that awards a broad delegation of
authority to an agency; even the decision of whether to pursue the program
at all is left to the discretion of the agency. 221 As Part II explained, directive
215 Brian G. Skotko, MD, MPP, MASSGENERAL HOSP. FOR CHILDREN, https://www.massgeneral.org/children/doctors/doctor.aspx?id=19069# (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
216 Amy Dockser Marcus, Agonizing Choice: A Brother’s Survey Touches a Nerve in Abortion Fight,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112829903217058110.
217 Amy Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09down.html.
218 As the American Medical Association additionally put it, the information required by the Act
“should provide a powerful corrective to the ‘bad news’ typically delivered to pregnant women whose
fetuses are diagnosed with the tested conditions. A body of research suggests that much of the information
now supplied is heavily biased, outdated, highly inaccurate, and almost always narrowly clinical.”
Adrienne Asch & David Wasserman, Informed Consent and Prenatal Testing: The Kennedy-Brownback
Act, 11 AMA J. ETHICS 721, 721 (2009).
219 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 217 (“About 90 percent of pregnant women who are given a Down
syndrome diagnosis have chosen to have an abortion.”).
220 LETICIA VELASQUEZ, Down, Hero Dad and Palin, in A SPECIAL MOTHER IS BORN 215, 215
(2011); see also 154 CONG. REC. S1267 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (specifically mentioning the high termination rates discussed in these articles in his statement on the Senate floor
in support of the bill); 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan citing
the same statistic); Kristin E. Blagg, Grad Student Inspires New Bill, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 17, 2005),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2005/3/17/grad-student-inspires-new-bill-pregnant/.
221 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(b)(1) (2012).
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rhetoric often appears in precisely these instances of otherwise broad delegation to agencies. Second, the legislative history of the Act reveals that
Members of Congress consistently described the statute in a bifurcated manner. 222 On the one hand, they described the statute as containing a broad legal
rule that would apply to a woman who receives a diagnosis of a “prenatally
or postnatally diagnosed condition[]” 223 or, more generally, a “disability.” 224
On the other hand, whenever these Members turned to anecdotes or origin
stories designed to communicate the core policy concern that animated the
Act, they invariably discussed the example of Down syndrome. 225 An interpretation that views the statutory reference to “Down syndrome” as directive
rhetoric captures this bifurcated policy intent—something other interpretations fail to accomplish.
IV. INSTITUTIONALLY INQUISITIVE RHETORIC
A final type of rhetoric in congressional statutes is institutionally inquisitive rhetoric. This is inserted into statutes in order to solicit opinions from
the nonpartisan offices of Congress that provide feedback to Members and
committees during the legislative process. Statutory text directed at these offices is “institutionally inquisitive” in that it operates as a question to these
nonpartisan offices; it is Congress’s way of asking these offices to provide
an answer to a question about the details of a bill.
Two of these nonpartisan offices are particularly notable. The first is the
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), an office that calculates the anticipated amount that a bill, if enacted, will cost in expenditures by the federal
government. 226 As Professor Barbara Sinclair has observed, these cost estimates can give rise to a procedural point of order and “can become powerful
political weapons”; consequently, they have become a delicately managed
part of the legislative process. 227 Since the CBO cost estimate is based on
statutory text, this means—as Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman phrased it—that “the congressional budget score has an enormous impact on statutory language.” 228 Statutory text often is designed specifically to
alter the CBO cost estimate, in other words. In this regard, statutory text that
222

See 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan) (speaking generally about prenatally and postnatally diagnosed conditions but highlighting Down syndrome with emphasis); 154 CONG. REC. S1267 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (speaking generally about various conditions but highlighting the large number of pregnancies terminated after a Down
syndrome diagnosis).
223 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
224 154 CONG. REC. S1267 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
225 E.g., 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
226 SINCLAIR, supra note 60, at 127.
227 Id. at 127–28.
228 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 123, at 728.
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impacts the cost estimate of the bill frequently is addressed, at least primarily,
to this nonpartisan office.
The second noteworthy audience for institutionally inquisitive rhetoric
consists of the Offices of the Parliamentarian in the House and Senate. Each
of these offices makes the important determination of which committee (or
committees) will have jurisdiction over the bill in its respective chamber. 229
Certain details often are included in statutory text in an effort to alter or influence these determinations. 230 In these instances, statutory text is drafted
primarily with committee referral, not court enforcement, in mind.
Institutionally inquisitive rhetoric therefore addresses a unique intended
audience (a nonpartisan office of Congress), and it does so with a unique
illocutionary force (the force of a question).
Unlike the other forms of nonoperative rhetoric, however, Congress
does not insert institutionally inquisitive rhetoric into locations of statutory
redundancy, or into any comparable statutory feature that might predictably
evade enforcement by the courts. It can be concluded, therefore, that Congress does not use pure institutionally inquisitive rhetoric in enacted statutes—and so courts are not warranted in refusing to interpret or enforce this
rhetoric. Instead, Congress inserts rhetoric that is designed to serve a dual
function: it is designed to direct the courts regarding the enforcement of a
policy (an operative legal function) and to solicit an answer from a nonpartisan office (an institutionally inquisitive function). In the following pages,
this dual-purpose rhetoric will be referred to as operative-inquisitive rhetoric.
How should the courts interpret operative-inquisitive rhetoric in statutes? Bressman and Gluck provided an interesting answer to this question.
These scholars argue on behalf of a “CBO canon,” which would direct the
courts in cases of statutory ambiguity to construe operative-inquisitive rhetoric in a manner that would render the implementation of this rhetoric consistent with the presumptions that CBO relied on when developing its cost
estimate. 231 In other words, they argue for construing this rhetoric in a manner
consistent with CBO assumptions about how the operative-inquisitive rhetoric would be implemented. 232
In defense of this canon, Bressman and Gluck argue that it would accurately capture congressional intent in a way that current interpretive practice
does not. 233 Bressman and Gluck believe that the CBO canon is faithful to
congressional intent because, to their minds, Congress’s overriding goal
229

See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 7–
8 (1997).
230 For a discussion of these drafting tactics, see id. at 8 (discussing the tactic of “amending a law
that is already in their committee’s jurisdiction”); id. at 116 (discussing the tactic of “clever drafting of
bill titles and preambles”); id. at 117 (discussing the tactic of “shift[ing] agency oversight of an issue”).
231 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 123, at 782.
232 Id.; see also Gluck, supra note 9, at 182.
233 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 123, at 782.
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when inserting operative-inquisitive rhetoric into statutes is to limit the realworld cost of a bill’s implementation. 234 In support of this point, Bressman
and Gluck point toward a slightly different observation, however: they observe that the overriding goal of many policymakers when inserting operative-inquisitive rhetoric is the solicitation of a desired cost estimate from
CBO. 235 As such, the CBO canon is founded upon an unstated assumption:
namely, that Congress solicits CBO cost estimates due to its desire to limit
the real-world costs of implementing this statutory text.
In effect, this is an argument that the institutionally inquisitive dimension of operative-inquisitive rhetoric is not an end in itself. Instead, it suggests not only that this rhetoric is designed to solicit a CBO cost estimate, but
also that this score itself is then meant to serve a further purpose. This further
purpose, it presumes, is an operative legal purpose: namely, the purpose of
limiting real-world implementation costs, including through enforcement by
the courts. In this regard, the CBO canon repeats the basic interpretive move
that has been the focus of this Article: it observes a congressional action (the
production of statutory text that solicits a desired estimate from CBO), and it
assumes that Congress undertook this action for operative legal reasons (to
constrain the costs of the bill’s real-world implementation, and to use the
courts in service of this goal).
One of this Article’s goals is to illustrate the insufficiency of this interpretive move. This Article has argued that interpreters cannot simply assume
that a congressional action or decision is motivated by an operative legal intent, even when that action or decision relates directly to statutory text. Instead, it has argued that it is necessary in this instance to ask what Congress’s
underlying motivation is for using operative-inquisitive rhetoric to solicit desired CBO cost estimates. Does Congress pursue this goal as part of a larger
operative desire to control actual implementation costs, including through
the courts? Does it instead pursue this goal with a directive desire, merely to
suggest to agencies the preferred amount of expenditures that this rhetoric
will produce? Or does Congress merely possess an expressive desire to send
a message of fiscal responsibility to constituents—a desire that might be entirely disconnected from any concern for controlling real-world implementation costs?
A broader political analysis would be necessary in order to discover the
answers to these questions. The Author of this Article suspects that, in many
instances, Congress solicits specific cost estimates solely for expressive reasons. Regardless, the need for further analysis underscores the central point
of this Article: that interpreters cannot simply rely on the unstated presumption that congressional actions, simply because they are related to statutory
text, are animated by operative legal motivations.
234

Id. (“Given the centrality of the CBO score to the drafting of that statute, construing the statutory
ambiguity consistently with the assumed score . . . seems an obvious, and more easily ascertainable, way
for a court to reflect the legislative bargain.”).
235 See id. at 764.
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THEORY APPLIED: UNITED STATES V. JICARILLA APACHE NATION

To highlight the impact that the theory of Congress’s four rhetorics can
have on the courts, consider the case of United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation. 236 In Jicarilla, the Court needed to decide whether the “fiduciary exception” to the attorney–client privilege allowed Native American tribes to
access certain legal documents from the federal government—documents the
government had obtained pursuant to its management of trust funds on behalf
of the tribes. 237 The Court held that the “fiduciary exception” would apply
only if the Jicarilla Apache Nation could identify a specific statutory provision that signaled Congress’s desire for the federal government to assume a
set of trust responsibilities akin to those seen in the context of common-law
trusts. 238 Whether such a provision existed, the Court said, ultimately depended on the proper interpretation of section 101 of the American Indian
Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994. 239 In that section, Congress
had specified: “The Secretary’s proper discharge of the trust responsibilities
of the United States shall include (but are not limited to) the following: (1)
Providing adequate systems for accounting for and reporting trust fund balances. . . . (8) Appropriately managing the natural resources located within
the boundaries of Indian reservations and trust lands.” 240
Jicarilla, therefore, would be determined by an issue of statutory construction: the issue of whether the catchall reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United States” in the lead-in to paragraphs (1) through (8) was
intended to reference a broad fiduciary duty (i.e., a duty akin to that found in
the context of common-law trusts). 241
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito found that the catchall term did not,
and could not, refer to such a broad fiduciary duty. 242 In defense of this holding, the Court said:
When Congress provides specific statutory obligations, we will not read a “catchall” provision
to impose general obligations that would include those specifically enumerated. “As our cases
have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment
236
237

law”).

564 U.S. 162 (2011).
Id. at 174 (specifying that “that trust is defined and governed by statutes rather than the common

238 Id. at 178 (“[T]he Tribe must point to a right conferred by statute or regulation.”). Justice Sotomayor’s dissent vigorously objected to this holding. See id. at 206. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
upshot of that decision, I fear, may very well be to reinvigorate the position of the dissenting Justices in
White Mountain Apache and Mitchell II, who rejected the use of common-law principles to inform the
scope of the Government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.”).
239 See id. at 178.
240 American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 101, 108
Stat. 4239, 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2012)).
241 See Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at 177–78.
242 Id. at 185–86.
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which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” Reading the statute to incorporate
the full duties of a private, common-law fiduciary would vitiate Congress’ specification of
narrowly defined disclosure obligations. 243

In other words, the specific responsibilities listed in paragraphs (1)
through (8) are responsibilities that trustees are expected to perform in the
context of common-law trusts. Consequently, if the reference to “the trust
responsibilities of the United States” in the lead-in to paragraphs (1) through
(8) referred broadly to all the responsibilities of common-law trustees, then
those paragraphs would add nothing to the statute as operative legal rhetoric.
Relying on the rule against surplusage, then, the Court rejected the construction sought by the Jicarilla Apache Nation. 244 In doing so, it effaced many of
Congress’s goals in drafting the statute—goals that attentiveness to alternative statutory rhetorics would have made apparent.
A.

Interpretation #1: Operative Legal Rhetoric

As with the statutes analyzed in the foregoing pages, a side-by-side
comparison of competing interpretations can reveal the congressionally intended meaning of the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act
of 1994—as well as the shortcomings of the Court’s interpretation in
Jicarilla. First, consider an interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8) that
is consistent with the Court’s premises. The proper interpretation of those
paragraphs, the Court suggested, must view them as operative legal rhetoric
that contributes a nonredundant idea or rule to the statute. 245 The Court did
not endorse a specific interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8); rather, it
simply asserted that the proper interpretation, whatever it might be, must accord with these rhetorical premises. 246
These premises are so utterly out of step with the realities of the statute’s
production, however, that it is nearly impossible to discover a viable interpretation that accords with them. Taken as operative legal rhetoric, paragraphs (1) through (8) contain a legion of statutory redundancies—redundancies that plainly were not scrivener’s errors, but rather were intended by the
statute’s drafters. These redundancies are so numerous and significant that it
is impossible to locate any clarifying function or distinct legal meaning that
the paragraphs might contribute as operative legal rhetoric.
Consider paragraph (1) that was added by section 101 of the Act in
question. One of the requirements of this paragraph obligates the Secretary
243 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825,
837 (1988)).
244 Id.
245 See id.
246 Id.
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to “[p]rovid[e] adequate systems for accounting for . . . trust fund balances.” 247 Members of Congress involved in the Act’s drafting and passage
plainly did not view this as the articulation of a new, nonredundant legal requirement. For one thing, this “accounting” requirement is redundant with a
provision that appears on the very same page of the statute. Under section 102(a) of the Act, the Secretary of the Interior “shall account for the
daily and annual balance of all funds held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of an Indian tribe or an individual Indian.” 248 The paragraph (1) accounting requirement differs from this 102(a) requirement only in that it requires the Secretary to provide “adequate systems” to achieve this accounting-related goal, an additional element that adds nothing to the statutory directive. 249 Given the proximity of these redundant provisions, Congress must
have been aware of the statutory overlap, yet it included both.
This is just the beginning of the ways in which paragraph (1) fails to
articulate a nonredundant legal requirement. The Act’s legislative history
contains clear evidence that Congress understood the paragraph (1) accounting requirement to be redundant with preexisting provisions in the United
States Code. 250 A report by the Committee on Government Operations that
directly shaped the Act’s trust-related provisions 251 emphasized that “[t]he
Federal Government is obligated by statute and treaty to properly discharge
all its fiduciary responsibilities to native Americans, including accounting
for Indian trust funds.” 252 The report was able to make this assertion despite
being written two years before the enactment of paragraph (1), a fact that
illustrates the Committee’s understanding that paragraph (1) would be redundant with preexisting federal laws. Importantly, this understanding also was
reiterated by Representative Synar, who ostensibly drafted the statutory text
found in paragraph (1). 253
What, then, about the statutory overlap that was at issue in Jicarilla:
namely, the potential overlap between the paragraph (1) accounting requirement and the lead-in reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United
States”? Time and again, important Members and committees of Congress
described the paragraph (1) accounting requirement as one of the federal government’s already existing “fiduciary responsibilities” or “trust
247

American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 101, 108
Stat. 4239, 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(1)).
248 § 102(a), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4011(a)).
249 Compare § 101, 108 Stat. at 4240, with § 102(a), 108 Stat. at 4240.
250 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 57 (1992) (finding that the government is already “obligated by
statute and treaty to properly discharge all its fiduciary responsibilities”).
251 H.R. REP. NO. 103-778, at 30 (1994) (“[T]o improve the investment services delivered to the trust
account owners, we are incorporating suggestions made in the April 1992 report.”).
252 H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 57 (emphasis added).
253 See Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Management of the $2 Billion Indian Trust Fund: Hearing Before
the Env’t, Energy, and Nat. Res. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 102d Cong. 64–65
(1991) (statement of Rep. Synar) [hereinafter Indian Trust Fund Hearing].
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responsibilities.” 254 The aforementioned committee report said, for example:
“The most fundamental fiduciary responsibility of the government, and the
Bureau, is the duty to make a full accounting of the property and funds held
in trust for the 300,000 beneficiaries of Indian trust funds.” 255 Representative
Synar was careful to clarify this overlap in meaning in an exchange with an
official from the General Accounting Office at a hearing—and to do so in the
precise language of paragraph (1). The following exchange ensued:
[Mr. SYNAR.] Can you tell the subcommittee whether the BIA’s internal system for accounting for and reporting the trust fund balances are adequate?
Mr. STEINHOFF. They are not. . . .
Mr. SYNAR. Those responsibilities of reporting and accounting for those trust funds are critical to their fiduciary responsibilities?
Mr. STEINHOFF. Yes. 256

It is difficult to locate any meaningful sense in which these “fiduciary
responsibilities” might differ from the “trust responsibilities” mentioned in
the statute—and, indeed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs used these descriptions
interchangeably. 257 It seems clear that the individuals most deeply involved
in the drafting and passage of the Act at issue in Jicarilla understood the plain
meaning of the reference to “trust responsibilities” in the lead-in to be redundant with the paragraph (1) accounting requirement.
Meanwhile, the Court in Jicarilla identified only one possible interpretation of this lead-in reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United
States” that could redeem it from accusations of redundancy 258—and this interpretation plainly failed to provide the redemption that the Court sought.
According to this interpretation, the reference to “the trust responsibilities of
the United States” referred not to a common-law fiduciary duty, but instead
to the additional statutory obligations of the federal government. 259 Yet, as
Representative Synar’s statement and the aforementioned congressional report make clear, the drafters and supporters of the Act understood even a
reference to the government’s preexisting statutory obligations to be redundant with paragraph (1). In this regard, it seems unavoidable that the lead-in
reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United States” was, as a legal
matter, intentionally redundant with paragraph (1).

254
255
256
257
258
259

E.g., id. at 44; H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 7.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 7 (emphasis added).
Indian Trust Fund Hearing, supra note 253, at 44 (emphasis added).
Id. at 220.
See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 185–86 (2011).
See id.

510

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[26:2

According to the drafters and ratifiers of paragraph (1), therefore, the
“accounting” requirement found in this paragraph was intentionally redundant in at least three different respects. House Report 102-499 summarized
this state of affairs: the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it said, already had been the
target of repeated “congressional directives designed to provide a full and
accurate accounting.” 260 The problem was not that binding legal statements
had not been issued to the Bureau that would create an accounting requirement. Rather, the problem was that “[t]he Bureau has repeatedly ignored directives to undertake needed management reform measures.” 261
Similar redundancies can easily be found throughout paragraphs (1)
through (8). The additional paragraph (1) requirement relating to “reporting
trust fund balances” was redundant with paragraph (5), 262 with the lead-in
reference to “trust responsibilities,” 263 and with existing legal requirements. 264 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent: “[N]ot even the
Government argues that it had no disclosure obligations with respect to Indian trust funds prior to the enactment of the 1994 Act.” 265 Paragraph (3) was
redundant with existing legal requirements. 266 Paragraph (7) was redundant
with paragraph (1) and with section 102(a) of the Act. 267 Indeed, it is more
difficult to identify a nonredundant provision in paragraphs (1) through (8)
than it is to locate a duplicative one.
These abundant, intentional redundancies plainly undermine the Court’s
interpretation of the statute in Jicarilla. The Court had ruled out the construction of the statute offered by the Jicarilla Apache Nation, and it had done so
simply because that interpretation would have prevented paragraphs (1)
through (8) from serving a nonredundant purpose as operative legal

260

H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 2.
Id. at 3.
262 Paragraph (5) requires the reporting of trust fund balances, American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 101(5), 108 Stat. 4239, 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 162a(d)(5) (2012)), and paragraph (1) requires the Secretary of the Interior to establish “adequate systems” to report trust fund balances, § 101(1), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(1)).
263 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 7 (“The most fundamental fiduciary responsibility of the government, and the Bureau . . . includes the continuing obligation to report to the tribes and individual accountholders about the Federal Government’s management of the trust funds.”).
264 See id.
265 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 205 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
266 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 58 (1992) (“The BIA’s continuing refusal to reconcile audit and
certify all Indian trust fund accounts was arbitrary, capricious unreasonable and contrary to the clear congressional intent as expressed in five successive Federal laws governing the BIA’s annual appropriations
from 1987 to 1991.”). Paragraph (3) stated that one of the responsibilities of the Secretary was “[p]roviding periodic, timely reconciliations to assure the accuracy of accounts.” § 101(3), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(3)).
267 Paragraph (7) requires “adequate staffing, supervision, and training for trust fund management
and accounting.” § 101(7), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(7)).
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rhetoric. 268 Yet it appears that Congress had intentionally drafted these paragraphs in a redundant manner. In other words, some aspect of the logic animating the rule against surplusage had broken down in the drafting of paragraphs (1) through (8).
B.

Interpretation #2: Expressive-Directive Rhetoric

Next, consider an interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8) that views
these paragraphs as expressive-directive rhetoric. To begin, notice that these
paragraphs provide a paradigmatic instance of directive rhetoric. First, they
appear within a redundancy-encouraging feature of the statute, since these
paragraphs operate as example clauses. Second, they are addressed to an executive agency—the very audience that Congress addresses through directive
rhetoric. Third, they are offered in a context that, much to its chagrin, Congress had discovered was a context of broad delegation. Despite the legal
controls that Congress had previously tried to place upon the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it found that as a practical matter, the Bureau almost inevitably
operated in a space of broad discretion with respect to its management of
trusts. 269
Fourth, an interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8) as directive rhetoric is superior from a textualist perspective. As the foregoing pages explained, there is no viable interpretation that views these paragraphs as operative legal rhetoric and also respects the rule against redundancy. By contrast, an interpretation of these paragraphs as directive rhetoric easily finds a
nonredundant rhetorical purpose in these paragraphs. According to this interpretation, the lead-in reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United
States” articulated a broad legal rule, while paragraphs (1) through (8) identified the specific subset of these “trust responsibilities” that Congress hoped
to see the Bureau of Indian Affairs prioritize in its attempts to address its
myriad failures as a trustee.
Fifth, this interpretation is even more compelling from an intentionalist
perspective. The committee report mentions paragraphs (1) through (8) only
once—describing these paragraphs not as binding legal rules, but rather as “a
list of guidelines for the Secretary’s proper discharge of trust responsibilities.” 270 This statement establishes two tiers of responsibility for the Secretary. On the one hand, it refers to “responsibilities” of the Secretary—a term
which suggests a set of duties that it is incumbent upon the Secretary to perform. On the other hand, it refers to paragraphs (1) through (8) as “a list of
guidelines” for the Secretary—a description which suggests that paragraphs
268 See Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at 185–86 (“As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt
an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same
law.” (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988))).
269 See supra note 266; infra notes 271–272 (on BIA ignoring statutory directives).
270 H.R. REP. NO. 103-778, at 15–16 (1994).
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(1) through (8) are designed merely to “guide” or steer the Secretary in her
efforts to implement those more fundamental responsibilities. Through this
bifurcation, the committee report suggests that Congress understood paragraphs (1) through (8) to be serving a different rhetorical function than that
performed by the lead-in reference to “trust responsibilities”—a function of
guiding the agency, rather than (or in addition to) issuing new binding commands to that agency.
This possibility is reinforced by the fact that Congress did not seem to
view the core problem regarding trust fund management as having resulted
from a lack of binding legal requirements. To Members of Congress, rather,
the problem was that the existence of binding statutory requirements was
proving insufficient to spur the Bureau of Indian Affairs to action. Describing
the Bureau’s “failure to comply with congressional directives,” 271 House Report 102-499 observed: “The Bureau has repeatedly ignored [congressional]
directives to undertake needed management reform measures.” 272 According
to the report, Congress’s only success in coercing action by the Bureau had
resulted not from its binding legal directives, but instead from a different
strategy that Congress possessed with respect to the Bureau. 273 As the report
put it: “To the extent the Bureau has made any progress in this area, it appears
that the subcommittee’s continuing oversight hearings have been virtually
the only reason.” 274 If Congress does indeed conceptualize some of its statutory language as akin to a reassertion of the pressure applied in oversight
hearings, rather than as a creation new, nonredundant binding obligations,
therefore, it makes sense that Congress would take this approach in paragraphs (1) through (8).
Next, consider these paragraphs as expressive rhetoric. Quite clearly,
there were special-interest groups that were uniquely attentive to the Act at
issue in Jicarilla: the tribes whose trusts were being managed by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. Representative Synar was explicit about the fact that the
Act had been drafted not only with these interest groups in mind, but also in
close consultation with them. 275 As Synar put it: “[The Act] was prepared
with the advice and counsel of many native Americans and tribal officials.” 276
Did paragraphs (1) through (8) speak, then, in the language and categories
that were meaningful to them? It appears so. In the hearings that preceded
the passage of the Act, for example, the controller of the Blackfeet Tribe
offered a statement to the congressional subcommittee that was investigating
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H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 15; see also id. at 56 (“The Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . has failed to
fulfill its fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the Indian trust fund.”).
272 Id. at 3.
273 See id. at 5.
274 Id.
275 See 139 CONG. REC. E1017 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1993) (statement of Rep. Synar).
276 Id.
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the Bureau’s trust fund mismanagement. 277 In the statement, the controller
emphasized three essential areas in which the tribes believed the Bureau
should improve: reconciliation of funds, performance of audits, and development and distribution of accurate account balances. 278 These topics are central to paragraphs (1) through (8); they are addressed by paragraphs (1), (3),
(4), and (5) of the statutory text at issues in Jicarilla. As such, these paragraphs spoke directly to the concerns that the tribes had voiced to Congress
prior to the Act’s passage, thereby acknowledging that Congress had heard
the tribes’ concerns and would prioritize them during its continuing oversight
of the Bureau. In this regard, paragraphs (1) through (8) also seem to have
been intended as expressive rhetoric.
Once paragraphs (1) through (8) are understood to be expressive-directive rhetoric, the Court’s logic in Jicarilla falls apart. The reference to
“the trust responsibilities of the United States” certainly can refer to the
broader set of fiduciary duties that are incumbent upon common-law trustees,
and it can do so without “render[ing] superfluous another portion of that same
law,” as the Court put it. 279 Indeed, such an interpretation would fulfill the
vision of Representative Synar, the ostensible author of paragraphs (1)
through (8), whose core frustration was that Congress had previously “been
unable to get the responsiveness that we need out of the BIA to perform the
basic fiduciary responsibilities which we expect out of any trustee.” 280 Instead
of seriously considering this interpretation, however, the Court simply relied
on the fiction that Congress had drafted paragraphs (1) through (8) as nonredundant operative legal rhetoric. It is an interpretation that cannot be taken
seriously by a Court that understands itself to be a faithful agent of Congress—and the sooner this presumption is discarded, the sooner courts will
begin to genuinely fulfill this professed interpretive duty.
CONCLUSION
For much of our nation’s legal history, the rule against surplusage has
been regarded as a central tenet of statutory interpretation. By and large, this
treatment has been warranted; the rule expresses a laudatory deference to the
specific word choices that Congress makes when it drafts a statute and often
leads to accurate and commonsense interpretations of federal statutes. When
277

See generally Indian Trust Fund Hearing, supra note 252, at 98–108.
See id. at 99. As the Controller put it: “[The increasing control of tribes over trust funds] in no
way diminishes BIA’s trust responsibility. The reconciliation and audit of these funds to a specific point
in time by a contractor will correct the cumulative effects of the BIA’s poor management up to that date,
but the accuracies of those account balances from that point in time into the future is dependent upon the
BIA’s success in developing and implementing a comprehensive management plan staffed by competent
and experienced personnel.” Id.
279 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 185 (2011) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)).
280 140 CONG. REC. H10,488 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994) (statement of Rep. Synar) (emphasis added).
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the rule is applied without any understanding of Congress’s four rhetorics,
however, it predictably leads interpreters astray. In response, this Article has
attempted to shine a light on these different congressional rhetorics. In so
doing, it hopefully will lead interpreters to constructions of federal statutes
that are more logical, more nuanced, and more faithful to congressional intent.

